University of Mississippi

eGrove
Statements of Position

American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) Historical Collection

2000

Comment letters Re: Statements of Independence Concepts
Indendence Standards Board

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_sop
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
Indendence Standards Board, "Comment letters Re: Statements of Independence Concepts" (2000).
Statements of Position. 717.
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aicpa_sop/717

This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) Historical Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Statements of Position by an
authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

1

VEDDER PRICE

VEDDER, PRICE, KAUFMAN & KAMMHOLZ
805 THIRD AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022-2203
212-407-7700
FACSIMILE: 212-407-7799

DAN L. GOLDWASSER
212-407-7710

A PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING VEDDER, PRICE, KAUFMAN & KAMMHOLZ, PC.
WITH OFFICES IN CHICAGO, NEW YORK CITY, AND LIVINGSTON, NEW JERSEY

December 12, 2000

Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Flr.
New York, NY 10036-8775
Attn: ED 00-02
Re: Statements o f Independence Concepts
Gentlemen:
I wish to commend you for the excellent job you and your staff have done in formulating
a conceptual framework for audit independence standards. Quite frankly, I would not change a
single word (a recommendation I only infrequently make - see my comments dated July 16, 2000
on the SEC’s independence proposal, a copy o f which is attached hereto). Not only is this
document a logical and clear statement o f the factors which must be considered in formulating
independence standards, it is sufficiently flexible to enable the Board to address the issue o f the
client’s economic importance to the audit firm and audit team, an issue which has too long been
ignored by the profession the professional literature. I, therefore, encourage you to adopt this
statement even though it is not in accord with the current thinking o f the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the “SEC”) as more fully discussed below.
The major problem with your Exposure Draft is that it is not wholly consistent with the
SEC’s newly adopted independence standards. Indeed, one o f the reasons why I urged the SEC
not to adopt its proposed independence rule was that it would impair the Board’s ability to adopt
a conceptual framework. Now, rather than designing the ideal structure for formulating
independence standards, you are forced to design a structure that must accommodate the
principles embodied in the SEC’s new rule. This is truly unfortunate and I remain puzzled why
the public members o f the Board encouraged the SEC to proceed with the adoption o f its
proposal.

To be sure, there is much in the SEC’s new rule which is consistent with the Board’s
proposed Statement of Independence Concepts. For example,
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•

The SEC has recognized that the primary goal o f independence standards
is to maximize the reliability o f financial data and that independence
standards are only a means to that end;

•

The SEC has recognized that audit independence can never be perfect and
that a certain degree o f impairment can be tolerated; and

•

The SEC has adhered to the principle o f “independence in appearance”
and has opted for a “reasonable man” standard to apply that principle.

On the other hand, there are three fundamental differences between the approach taken by
the Board and the approach taken by the SEC, and those differences are discussed below.
Use of Safeguards
Fundamental to the Board’s proposed conceptual framework is the concept o f safeguards;
i.e., that certain impairments o f independence may be sufficiently mitigated by establishing
safeguards that are likely to assure objectivity and integrity notwithstanding factors which either
impair or are perceived to impair audit independence. The SEC’s proposal does not evidence
this concept and the Staff o f the SEC has categorically rejected the safeguard approach.
Although the SEC rule does provide for the mitigation o f sanctions for certain violations o f its
independence rules if certain safeguards are in place, that provision is simply designed to
encourage the use o f safeguards without eliminating the violation. From a legal prospective,
both the client and its auditors could be subject to civil liability claims as a result o f the
infraction. I consider to be an unfortunate choice on the part o f the SEC.
The Disclosure Concept
The SEC, in dealing with the gray areas o f independence impairments, has chosen to
employ a disclosure concept. Thus, the SEC has mandated the disclosure o f certain relationships
which it believes might be perceived as impairing audit independence. Thus, the SEC considers
such matters simply to be a “cost o f capital” issue or a “business question” and not a “legal
question.” By requiring public companies to disclose the extent o f the non-audit services being
provided to it by its outside auditors, investors and creditors would be able to decide whether
reliance upon the auditors’ report entails added risk and their perception o f that added risk will be
reflected in an increase in the company’s cost o f capital. In this way, the company’s board or
audit committee will have to decide whether it is more beneficial for the company to employ its
VPNY/#66544.1
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outside auditors to perform non-audit services or to refrain from doing so and possibly enjoy a
lower cost o f capital.
While this concept appears logical on its face and has the advantage o f decentralizing the
decision-making process, it is flawed in practice. As I pointed out in my letter to the SEC,
disclosure o f non-audit services does not really provide the reader with useful information. At
best, this is secondary information as it provides the reader with no further understanding of the
operations, assets or prospects o f the subject company. It only addresses the reliability o f the
expertised financial information. Secondly, it does not provide the reader with sufficient
information to make an informed judgment regarding the reliability o f the financial information
as it does not convey the extent o f the audit testing performed by the auditors or the safeguards
that are in place to assure objectivity and integrity. Equally important, it tells the reader little
about the importance o f the client to the audit firm and the audit team. Lastly, by providing this
information, the reader is caused to doubt the entire regulatory scheme. Thus, if the reader
believes that the performance o f non-audit services will likely impair the auditors’ objectivity
and integrity, he will begin to wonder what the independence rules actually accomplish, if
anything. Thus, the reader might not only regard the subject company’s financial statements to
be less than reliable, but also that all audited financial statements are suspect. In this sense, the
disclosure concept will deter the public’s willingness to rely upon audited financial information,
not enhance that willingness. In short, it will be counterproductive to the whole purpose o f
having independence standards.
For these reasons, I have come to reject the disclosure approach and believe that the
Board’s safeguard approach is the best way to address the gray areas o f audit independence.
The Carve-Out Concept
In the rule adopted by the SEC, there is an exemption from the limitation on internal audit
services for companies with less than $200 million in total assets. This is clearly a compromise
with respect to companies that are not likely to be able to afford their own internal audit
functions. The Board’s proposed conceptual framework does not appear to embrace such an
exclusion, notwithstanding its flexible approach. On the other hand, to the extent that small
public companies are less likely to be able to influence the objectivity o f outside auditors than
large public companies, this approach may not be inconsistent with the Board’s approach. The
problem, however, is that if a small public company is audited by a small CPA firm, the risk to
audit independence may actually be greater. In short, it is not the size o f the client, but rather the
size of the client in relationship to the size o f the audit firm that threatens audit independence.
VPNY/#66544.1
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The Board’s Dilemma
In the final analysis, the Board must decide whether it wishes to adopt a conceptual
framework which it believes is in the best interest o f the public and the profession or whether it
will modify its proposal to make it compatible with the rules adopted by the SEC. There can be
no question that the SEC has the final word on such matters as the Board exists only at the
pleasure of the SEC which is free to ignore any and all determinations which the Board might
make. Nevertheless, I strongly urge the Board to stand by its convictions on this issue and not
acquiesce to the SEC’s position even if this may precipitate the Board’s demise. I so urge the
Board for two reasons:
(1)

By altering its approach to audit independence, the Board will not be able to
effectively address the issue o f the client’s economic importance which is the
principal (if not the only remaining significant) independence issue; and

(2)

The SEC’s rule was not primarily aimed at audit independence, but rather was
aimed at increasing the relative importance o f the audit practices o f the Big Five
firms so as to make them effectively subject to regulation. Thus, the SEC’s rule
should not be considered o f precedential value to the Board’s determination.

The SEC’s rule addressed the issues o f when consulting and legal services, among others,
impair audit independence. If also addressed the financial interests in clients and entities within
a mutual fund complex and client employment issues. At best, these areas are now only subject
to minor interpretation and hardly justify the Board’s further existence. Indeed, considering the
four “guiding principles” which the SEC has adopted, any such interpretation is likely to be a
thankless task as these principles provide no useful guidance. Thus, if there is any reason to
continue the Board’s existence, it is to develop a standard for addressing the client’s economic
importance to the audit firm and audit team.
From my perspective, this cannot be achieved without some means o f assuring audit
objectivity and integrity when it passes beyond the limits o f the reasonable man standard. In
such cases, one would have to conclude that certain companies which are dominant in a given
geographic area simply cannot receive an independent audit. For example, is there an audit team
or audit office with such a broad spectrum o f work that it could remain viable without the
continued audit business o f a Walmart, Caterpillar, Dupont, Kodak or Microsoft. Each o f these
companies is the dominant economic force in their community, and the loss o f their audit
business would be the death knell of the audit office servicing the account. Thus, the only way to
VPNY/#66544.1
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maintain the objectivity o f the audits of these companies is to have the audit determinations
reviewed and approved by persons working in other offices whose compensation and continued
employment by their firm would not be adversely affected by the loss o f the client. Even if a
disclosure concept works (which I do not believe is the case for the reasons discussed above), it
would not be sufficient to offset this factor as no reasonable investor should give any more
credence to an audit report rendered by an auditor whose continued livelihood depends upon the
preservation o f the client relationship than a set o f financial statements published by the client
alone. In such cases, knowledge only makes the user better aware o f the problem, but does not
serve to limit the risks faced by the user. It is for this reason that I believe that if the Board is to
serve any further useful purpose it must adhere to the safeguard approach.
Secondly, I have concluded that the SEC proposed its new rule, not in an effort to
establish clear and viable independence standards (as the Board was well on its way to achieving
that goal), but rather to address a problem which the Board is not empowered to address; namely,
the fact that the Big Five accounting firms are deriving a diminishing percentage o f their
revenues and profits from their audit practices. Thus, the day is not far o ff when such firms
might simply decide to abandon their audit practices in view o f their high potential for liability
claims and their relatively low level of profitability. The decision o f Andersen Consulting to
sever its ties with Arthur Andersen underscores this possibility. Thus, I believe that the SEC was
seeking to cause the Big Five firms to limit their consulting practices so that their audit practices
would remain at the core o f their operations. In this way, the SEC would avoid the nightmare o f
the Big Five firms’ simply informing the SEC that they no longer wished to engage in a public
company audit practice.
While this may sound implausible, it does explain many o f the stranger aspects o f the
SEC’s recent actions; to wit:
•

It explains why the SEC chose to promulgate an independence standard
which did not address the all-important economic importance issue:

•

It explains why the SEC has devoted so much emotional and political
capital to this issue even thought there was neither a public outcry for this
action, one or more notorious cases o f non-audit services leading to audit
failures, nor statistical evidence supporting this conclusion;
It explains a number o f anomalies in the SEC’s proposal such as why the
SEC sought to prohibit legal advice but not tax advice;
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•

It explains why the SEC has pushed for independence investigations
within the Big Five firms, but has taken no enforcement action with
respect to even the serious violations that have been uncovered;

•

It explains why the SEC has chosen to prohibit contingent fees and
commissions but not regulate total fees;

•

It explains why the SEC was willing to jeopardize the continued existence
o f the ISB when the ISB represents the best hope o f addressing the
economic importance issue;

•

It explains why the SEC was so vehement in contending that its proposal
does not affect non-Big Five firms when its proposal made no such
distinction;

•

It explains why the SEC chose to negotiate the final provisions o f the rule
with the Big Five firms rather than simply base its rule on the public
submissions as is customary in agency rulemaking;

•

It explains the very personal attacks by the SEC on the AICPA and its
leadership and the SEC’s efforts to divide them from the AICPA members
who practice in small firms; and

•

It also explains why the SEC was simultaneously lobbying for enhanced
public participation in the POB and the A ICPA’s disciplinary processes.

Robert Elliott, the former Chairman o f the AICPA, perhaps first identified this possibility
when he characterized the SEC’s independence proposal as a “solution in search o f a problem.”
To be sure, the SEC perceived there to be a problem; however, it was one which the Congress
had not empowered the SEC to address. For this reason, the SEC chose to address it with the
only power it had —its authority to define audit independence. Thus, the Board should not
interpret the SEC’s rule as one designed to assure audit independence, but rather one intended to
prevent regulatory independence.

VPNY/#66544.1

Vedder Price
Independence Standards Board
December 12, 2000
Page 7

Conclusion
Again, I wish to commend the Board for its superb Statement o f Independence Concepts
and to encourage the Board to adopt it and to press forward with a statement addressing the
overall economic importance of the audit client.
Very truly yours

Dan L. Goldwasser
/mbb

VPNY/#66544.1
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INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS BOARD
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
RE:

20 December 2000

Exposure Draft: Statement of Independence Concepts.
Immediate Response.

Dear Board:
This is my immediate response to your Exposure Draft
Statement of Independence Concepts. My remarks below address the
definition of Independence.
Your standard needed a definition of Independence, and now
you have one. Good. The definition includes an objective,
reasonable person clause: "or can reasonably be expected to
compromise." This is good.
The definition, however, still has a lot of deficiencies:
1. Generally, the ED definition is more imprecise than it
could or ought to be. The words "pressure," "other factors,"
"compromise," and "ability" are too fuzzy. I am especially
concerned that an essential element of the definition relies on
the auditor's "ability" to make unbiased decisions. Arguments
over what are persons' "abilities" will go on for ever.
2. The concept of risk ought be overtly in the definition
because it is so essential to the meaning of auditor
independence. Just look at how often the word "risk" appears in
the ED. Put it in the definition if it is that important, which
it is.
3. "Unbiased" is a modern day term: Instead use the term
"impartial" because that was the term used during 1932-1934
lawmaking hearings which caused the independence requirement to
be inserted into the bills eventually becoming the U.S.
securities laws. I believe it is beneficial to liken the
required impartiality of an auditor (accountant-examiner) to that
of a judge. Using the word impartial or impartiality makes this
connection better. I prefer an impartial judge to an unbiased
judge.
"Impartial" is a stronger term than "unbiased." We need
judges and auditors who are impartial, not just "unbiased."
4.

As I have stated before, I find it regrettable that the

ED makes no reference whatsoever to the state of affairs which
gave birth to the U.S. securities laws and to the insertion of
the independence provisions into those laws. These sources of
the independence requirement cannot be legitimately ignored by
any person or body charged with the duty of producing an
authoritative definition of independence warranting any public
support. One gets the impression that the Board so dislikes the
legal system and the professionals who participate directly in it
that the Board has purposefully chosen to ignore that system in
producing an independence definition notwithstanding that that
system is the mother of the modern day audit profession. This
attitude toward the law is the profession's roadblock to
meaningful progress, even when the job of making progress is
handed to it on a silver platter as is the case of the SEC
handing the job to the Board in this case. I have previously
informed the task force and the Board where it might begin its
acquisition of this knowledge; see Committe citation below.
5. The following definition of independence is a much
better definition:
Free from relationships that a reasonable person
would expect to increase the risk of the accountant
examiner losing judgment-making impartiality.
Committe, Bruce Edward, "Independence of Accountants and
Legislative Intent,” 41 Administrative Law Review 33, 53 (1989).
Sincerely

Bruce Committe, CPA
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INDEPENDENCE STANDARDS BOARD
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
RE:

23 December 2000

Exposure Draft: Statement of Independence Concepts.
Extended Response.

Dear Board:
In a letter dated 20 December 2000 I sent my immediate
response to the Exposure Draft on Statement of Independence
Concepts: A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence (ED).
Now I provide an extended response in the format of answering the
five questions which appear on pages iii thru iv of the ED under
the same headings I use below.
DEFINITION OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
As I previously stated on 20 December 2000, the proposed ED
definition of independence uses words and terms that are too
fuzzy, indirect, and indefinite in their meaning ("other
factors," "compromise," "unbiased," and "auditor's ability."
Too, the definition appears to come out of thin air rather than
from logical and orderly development of ideas using authoritative
sources which would be, and are, the transcripts reporting 19321934 hearings leading to insertion of the accountant-examiner
independence requirement into Congressional bills that eventually
became The Securities Act of 1933 and The Securities Exchange Act
of 3934. The failure of the ED even to make reference (much less
make use of its content) to the one and only research report of
Congress' 1932-1934 consideration of the accountant-examiner
independence requirement is inexcusable and likely is best
explained by the fact that too many Board members have a large
indirect, but certain, financial interest in the outcome of its
work, that is, in whether CPA firms can continue lucrative but
conflicting consulting work along side their independent audit
work otherwise pursuant to the requirements of the federal
securities laws. See research report: Committe, Bruce Edward,
"Independence of Accountants and Legislative Intent," 41
Administrative Law Review 33, 53 (1989).
The term "risk" should appear directly in the definition.
1

The following definition is based on the hearing transcripts
referenced above, and the Board should adopt it instead of the
one now proposed:
Free from relationships that a reasonable person
would expect to increase the risk of the accountant
examiner losing judgment-making impartiality.
GOALS OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
The goal is not to report reliance on any "process.” Too,
those who make, and others who do not make but are nevertheless
interested in, wealth distribution decisions have more on their
mind than just "market efficiency." The goal of auditor
independence is to produce information that is trustworthy as to
its content and useful to the public in making wealth allocation
decisions, including, but not limited to, wealth allocation
decisions made within the environment of what is now conceptually
well known as the traditional and developing capital markets.
CONCEPTS AND BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
The ED proposes four basic concepts of auditor independence:
threats, safeguards, independent risk, and significance of
threats/effectiveness of safeguards. These should be replaced
with the following single concept: The auditor must eliminate and
avoid risks to his or her independence by avoiding all
relationships that a reasonable person would expect to increase
the risk of the accountant examiner losing judgment making
impartiality. Note how this basic concept and principal tracks
the above quoted definition of independence.
Whenever concerns
of independence arise, determining the appropriate action to take
requires merely asking and answering the question whether such
stated risk is present given any set of facts. Simple is better.
RISK MODEL
Forget the model stuff. The risk model appears to be a back
door way of inserting the concept of materiality into the
proposed independence rule. The reasonable person concept in
both the ED definition and my above proposed definition take care
of any materiality factor relevant to a rule on independence.
That is, the reasonable person idea subsumes the idea of
materiality. Note that my above proposed definition of
independence has the word "risk" built in; that is, there is no
need for a side bar discussion of "threats," "safeguards," "costbenefits," etc. Such matters are common sense, and do not
deserve special mentioning. By mentioning them and not other
relevant concepts they take on more importance than they should.
Such side bar discussions merely detract from the definition.
2

Keep it simple. Human concepts like "independence" are
best not reduced to models as humanity is too complex for such
simplifications that might work well outside the social sciences.
Models are useful devices for academic thought development within
the social sciences, but they can are not useful in societal
rulemaking the purpose of which is to describe behavior the
violation of which is to be the basis for public sanctions.
OTHER ISSUES
If the Board still expects to produce its independence
conceptual framework without any significant attention given to
the independence idea developed and contained in 1932-1934
hearings eventually leading to insertion of the independence
requirement into the statute, at the very least the Board ought
to explain, in its proposed independence conceptual framework,
why it has chosen to ignore such lawmaking authority.
To determine whether the definition of audit independence
proposed in this letter is better than the one proposed in the ED
I ask that the Board perform the following test: As a group,
read both definitions aloud, one after the other, and let each
Board member immediately after the reading aloud choose for
himself or herself which one sounds better (seems more logical).
Each writes his or her choice on paper. Then, let each Board
Member reveal his or her choice and state the reasons why the one
each selected sounds better (seems more logical). Those reasons
can form the basis for fleshing out the conceptual framework
beyond the mere defini
tion. If those participating in the test
drop whatever agendas they bring to the table from those who sent
them there, I believe the proposed definition that I have
offered will be selected by most, if not all, members of the
group.
The reason that my proposed defini
tion will seem more logical
is because its source is collective experience (revealed in 19321934 Congressional hearings which focused on the problem that
Congress planned, in part, for the independence requirement to
solve), and experience, especially in the social sciences, is a
very powerful (though not full proof) learning tool and guide
post as to what makes sense (is more logical). Too, the
definition that I propose is a simple collection of a lot of
experience, and such simplifictions, or reductions, are usually
more appreciated because of their immediately recognizable better
utility.
CONCLUSION
The ED has ignored the circumstances, events, and therefore
the purposes which have given rise to the legal requirement that
accountant examiners be independent in performing audit services
required by the U.S. and other securities laws. The ED appears
3

to be a hodge podge of ideas very much influenced by those who
have a desire to retain the current conflicts of interest which
exist when public accounting firms provide both audit and non
audit services sometimes to the very same business entity; what
other explanation could there be for ignoring the prelude to the
legal audit independence requirement?
For all the reasons stated above, the ED should consist of
the entire contents of Committe, Bruce Edward, "Independence of
Accountants and Legislative Intent," 41 Administrative Law Review
33, 53 (1989) wherein the last sentence reports the definition of
audit independence quoted above at the top of page 2 of this
extended response letter.
Sincerely
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wallmans@foliofn.co
m (Steven Wallman)

12/25/00 05:44 PM
Please respond to
wallmans

To: "Arthur Siegel (E-mail)" <ASiegel@cpaindependence.org>
cc:
Subject: Conceptual Framework ED

Arthur - Happy Holidays.
I read the November 2000 ED on independence and thought it was a great step
forward. Congratulations on making progress.
I hope 2001 is a good year
for you.
Steven M.H. Wallman
wallmans@foliofn.com
FOLIOfn Inc.,
8401 Old Courthouse Road
Vienna, Virginia 22182
703.245.4000; F: 703.245.4943
www.foliofn.com
What's Next.
This email message and any files transmitted with it are confidential
intended only for the person(s) to whom this email message is addressed.
If
you have received this email message in error, please notify the sender
immediately by telephone or email and destroy the original message without
making a copy. Thank you.
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RALPH S. SAUL
3030 ONE LOGAN SQUARE
18TH & CHERRY STREETS
P.O. BOX 7716
PHILADELPHIA, PA ,9192

December 26, 2000

Dear Art:
This letter responds to you request of December 14,
2000 for comments on the Board’s exposure draft of a
"Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence".
My major comment on the exposure draft relates to
the impact of the SEC’s recent revision of the Commission’s
Auditor Independence Requirements upon this project and
the broader issue of the future role of the Board. It
would appear that the SEC’s rule amendments regarding
auditor independence have preempted not only the proposed
conceptual framework but most of the future work of the
Board.
The definition of auditor independence in the draft
would appear to be preempted by the Preliminary Note to
Rule 2-01 and by Rule 2.01(b). Not only does the Commission
set forth a general standard for auditor independence in
Rule 2.01 but it also sets forth factors in the Preliminary
Note that it will consider in determining whether a rela
tionship or the provision of a service compromises inde
pendence. Moreover, the Preliminary Note in the Commission's
rule further preempts the Board’s work by going on to say
that registrants and accountants are encouraged to consult
with the Commission’s Office of the Chief Accountant before
entering into relationships, including relationships in
volving the provision of services, that are not explicitly
described in Rule 2-01. The Commission makes no reference
in Rule 2.01 to the future role of the Board - a Board which
the Commission itself created.
If this action by the Commission were not enough to
undermine the Board’s work, the Chief Accountant, in his
December 6, 2000 speech at the 28th Annual National Confer
ence on Current SEC Developments, appears to reject the
Board's entire conceptual framework because it does not
incorporate the four basic principles in the Commission's
Preliminary Note and the appearance concept in Rule 2.01.

As you know, the Commission over the past year has
urged the profession to strengthen its self-regulation
and it has praised the efforts of the Public Oversight
Board to act as overseer of the various professional bodies,
including the ISB, devoted to improving the quality of
audits of publicly held companies. The majority of our
Panel on Audit Effectiveness adopted this approach in its
report by asking the SEC to exercise restraint in its
rule making authority by delegating to the Board the
determination of any services that audit firms may not
provide to their clients. We also recommended that the
Board identify factors to be considered by auditors, audit
committees and client management in determining whether
a specific non-audit service is appropriate.
It is unfortunate that the Commission rejected this
approach but instead came forward with its own rule which
in the end echoed the Panel’s recommendations and followed
the directions in which your Board appeared to be heading.
In my view, this Commission, by choosing to regulate
directly, has seriously weakened your efforts and the future
efforts of the POB to act as a strong self-regulator for
the profession.
I have not provided detailed comments on the conceptual
framework, Art, because I think it is vital that the Board,
working with the POB, first determine its future role and
its relationship with the Commission. In my view, that
relationship must be based on the principle that the
auditing profession should regulate itself through a
strengthened POB, as well as ISB, as recommended by the
Panel on Audit Effectiveness. I think experience over
the next several years will demonstrate the wisdom of
that recommendation.
Sincerely,

cc:

William T. Allen, Chairman
Independence Standards Board
Charles A. Bowsher, Chairman
Public Oversight Board
Shaun F. O'Malley, Chairman
Panel on Audit Effectiveness

Mr. Arthur Siegel
Executive Director
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
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Tom Horton
< thorton@stetson.ed
u>

To: isb@cpaindependence.org
cc:
Subject: Exposure Draft: Statement of Independence Concepts

12/29/00 10:36 AM

Attention: Arthur Siegel, Executive Director
Dear Mr. Siegel:
This conceptual framework, in my opinion, strikes just the
right balance. I have no suggestions for change.
Congratulations on the achievement of a difficult task.
Sincerely,
Thomas R . Horton
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University of Wisconsin-Madison

School of Business
Grainger Hall
975 University Avenue
Madison, Wisconsin 53706-1323

January 20, 2001
Independence Standards Board
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Board Members:
Please find enclosed a copy of a paper that we are submitting as part of the comment process
for the Statement of Independence Concepts: A Conceptual Framework for Auditor
Independence (ED 00-2).
The paper, "Antecedents and Consequences of Independence Risk: Framework for Analysis,"
presents a framework that examines how incentives that may increase independence risk
interact with environmental and other factors to affect actual or perceived audit quality. We
explore the combined effects of direct incentives (e.g., direct investments, potential
employment), indirect incentives (e.g., interpersonal relationships), and iudgment-based
decisions (e.g., difficult accounting issues, materiality decisions, audit conduct decisions) on
independence risk. We also explore factors that may mitigate independence risk, such as
corporate governance, regulatory oversight, auditing firm policy and culture, and individual
auditor characteristics. Where relevant, we discuss findings from academic research as they
relate to the elements of our framework and provide an analysis of the effects of independence
risk on various stakeholders. We conclude the paper with suggestions for future actions by the
auditing profession, auditing firms, regulators, and academic researchers.
While the primary goal of the framework in our article is to provide direction for future
academic research, we believe that it also may be useful to the Independence Standards Board
for analyzing the issues identified during the Board’s consideration of the Conceptual
Framework Exposure Draft. Our comments, detailed specifically below, address your request
for input with particular emphasis on your Question Four.
Question Four: "What are your views on the appropriateness of the independence risk model?
Is there research that the Board should be made aware of that would be helpful in expanding
the model or otherwise making it more useful for independence decision makers?"
We believe that you have developed a potentially useful independence risk framework and
one that shares a number of similarities to the one presented in our article. For example, the
threats and safeguards articulated in the Conceptual Framework correspond to our analysis of

1

2

environmental conditions and mitigating factors relating to independence risk (see p. 25 in the
enclosed paper).
However, while there is overlap between our frameworks, ours differs from yours in the
following respects. First, our framework is more comprehensive in its discussion of factors
that contribute to possible threats to auditor independence (paragraph 11 in the Conceptual
Framework). For example, as discussed above, our framework includes a discussion of
various judgment-based decisions that allow independence risk to affect audit quality (e.g.,
pressure on difficult accounting issues, pressure on materiality judgments, and pressure on
audit scope and conduct). We believe that without a judgment-based decision, no mechanism
other than compromised integrity enables the threats to auditor independence to result in
reduced audit quality (see pp. 6 - 8 and p. 25 in the enclosed paper). We encourage the Board
to consider adding this type of discussion to the Conceptual Framework to better
communicate to all independence constituencies (auditors and non-auditors) the contexts in
which threats to independence arise.
We believe that the Board’s discussion of the safeguards to auditor independence is relatively
complete and is consistent with our analysis of mitigating factors. We prefer the method
whereby you categorize the safeguards according to where they reside (paragraph 14a of the
Conceptual Framework) because it is from the perspective of these various independence
constituencies that actions could be taken to respond to independence risk. We view the two
perspectives outlined in paragraphs 15 and 16 as secondary in describing the nature of these
actions and we believe that these should not be presented as alternatives to the discussion in
paragraph 14.
We are particularly interested in the idea of audit firm culture with respect to important
safeguards, and our paper proposes an audit firm culture continuum that you may wish to
consider as you further develop the Conceptual Framework (see p. 12 - 15 and p. 26 in the
enclosed paper). We believe that explicit and implicit auditing firm messages regarding
appropriate conduct within the firm likely have a significant impact on independence risk. We
propose an auditing firm culture continuum anchored by a "public duty culture" on one end
(lowest independence risk) and a "client advocacy culture" on the other end (highest
independence risk). This type of characterization may be helpful to the Board in clarifying
"advocacy threats" (paragraph 12c of the Conceptual Framework).
Other Comments
In paragraph 23 of the Conceptual Framework, a continuum of independence risk is
introduced as a way to characterize levels of independence risk that might trigger action by
independence decision makers. While the continuum is useful for illustrating the range of
independence risk, the discussion in paragraphs 24-26 may imply a higher level of precision
in implementation than the Board intends. For example, based on the discussion in paragraph
25, it is unclear whether action will be triggered by independence decision-makers when
independence risk is judged as at or below the remote level. Given that the Board introduces
the continuum and notes specific points along it, explicit discussion of "trigger" points seems

appropriate. Alternatively, it may be preferable to introduce the continuum by describing only
its endpoints, avoiding concerns over unnecessary specificity. Another concern regarding the
wording in the continuum is that the terms "remote" and "probable" are not unambiguously
defined. We caution the Board that this type of wording may lead to implementation
difficulties in the future.
With respect to the discussion of costs and benefits within the Conceptual Framework, one
cost that is not discussed, but that is in our framework (see the section "How are stakeholders
affected by independence risk?", p. 16), is the cost that other auditors, the broader profession,
and capital markets may bear when an individual auditor assumes a level of independence risk
that leads to a decline in audit quality. This can be viewed as one of the "second order"
effects in that it represents an externality that arises when an individual auditor does not fully
internalize the costs of his or her actions on the profession as a whole and on the efficient
allocation of capital. The Board might consider adding such a discussion, because such
externalities provide an important motivation for regulation and enforcement —i.e.,
independence rules. As recognized in the Conceptual Framework, it is difficult to measure
the costs and benefits of public goods such as financial statements and audit opinions. The
Board may wish to refer to a similar discussion in this regard by accounting standard setters
(see FASB Concepts Statement No. 2, paragraphs 133 - 140).
In addition to the above comments, you may find our summary of prior auditor independence
relevant research helpful (see footnotes 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, and 13 in the enclosed
paper).
Please feel free to contact any of us if you have questions about our paper.
Sincerely,

Karla Johnstone
Assistant Professor
kjohnstone@bus.wisc.edu

Terry Warfield
Associate Professor
twarfield@bus.wisc.edu

Enclosure
Cc: Michael H. Sutton
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Mr. Arthur Siegel
Executive Director
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775

Suite 2600
1601 Market Street
Philadelphia PA 19103-2499

Re: ED 00-2
January 24, 2001
Dear Mr. Siegel:
The ED of the ISB’s conceptual framework is well thought-out and comprehensive. After
reading the ED I have only one comment/suggestion. This deals with the emphasis or relative
importance of safeguards listed in paragraph 14.
My suggestions are based on 31 years experience with a Big 5 firm (including serving as
internal quality control review partner for several U.S. and non-U.S. offices), two years as a
member of an audit committee of a public company and four years as an “independent
director” of three private companies.
I believe that the most important safeguard is the value that firms and individual auditors
place on their reputations, followed very closely by the auditee’s “tone at the top.” Without
very high personal integrity underlying those two safeguards, the remaining safeguards are of
relatively little value. I therefore suggest a reordering of the safeguards in paragraph 14 to
emphasize those two and would reorder the remainder based on my experience on both sides
of the table (original # ’s in parenthesis):
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Value of reputations
Auditee’s “Tone at the Top”
Legal Liability
General Oversight
Peer Review programs
Rules, standards, etc.
Disciplinary Actions

(1)
(4)
(7)
(3)
(2)
(5)
(6)

Sincerely,

Retired Partner - Arthur Andersen LLP
Copy to: Dr. Henry R. Jaeniche, Drexel University
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February, 2001
Independence Standards Board, 6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Dear ISB Members:
The comments below are offered in response to the release of ED 00-2. They bear on the ED's
definition of Auditor Independence and the terminology employed for concepts of the Risk Model.
Yours truly,
Edward R. Scott

Independence Definition: Practitioner Reference:
As this exposure draft purports to provide a conceptual model for auditor independence it would
seem that a better definition of auditor independence might be as follows:
Auditor Independence is the objective application of auditing procedures.
As stated in paragraph #33 objectivity is the ability to make unbiased audit decisions. Such a definition
would be consistent with General Standard #2 requiring an independence of mental attitude on the part of
the auditor.i As Carmichael observes "independence of mental attitude" has historically served as the
conceptual definition of auditor independence:
There has been an official definition of audit
independence since Generally Accepted Auditing Standards were first
proposed in 1947 (Tentative Statement of Auditing StandardsTheir
Generally Accepted Significance and Scope). Essentially the same
definition exists today in AU section 220 of the AICPA’s codification of
auditing standards.
This concept of "practitioner independence" is recognized in the classical treatise by Mautz and Sharaf
when they say:
We can agree with those who contend that independence is basically a
state of m ind.ii
In an empirical study of professional sanctions Moriarity in a recent study noted that sanctions against
members of the AICPA for independence violations have increased at a lesser rate than have those for
violations of auditing standards. Although no tests were conducted here to assess the likelihood of the
sanctions being from populations of equal proportion or even opposite in magnitude these results would
seem to suggest that the conceptual definition in use is providing appropriate guidance to members of the
profession.iii In addition, Barry Melancon, the President of the AICPA, has noted that the SEC has never
brought an action alleging a lack of auditor independence.
Even the SEC enforcement director has admitted the commission has never
brought a case alleging that an audit failure occurred as a result of the
accounting firm's lack of independence. iv

Although, as ED paragraph #44 states, the auditor's state of mind can never be known by the
independence decision maker, it is the auditor's state of mind that is if fact of particular relevance.
Paragraph #6 makes clear that conformity to a set of rules alone is not sufficient when it states:
To be independent, an auditor must be able, and be reasonably expected
to be able, to overcome pressures and other factors that would prevent
unbiased audit decisions. Accordingly, the absence of a rule violation
does not mean that the auditor is independent
The "state of mind" criterion is also conceptually consistent with the personal attributes approach taken in
the exposure draft.
Construction:
In addition, it conforms to the rules for the construction of connotative definitions which require
that a definition be stated in the affirmative rather than negative. v vi That is it stipulates the distinguishing
property of independence which can exist although a lack of freedom from influences that might lead to bias
may not.
Justas one
have fuel, oxygen, and heat without a fire the presence of a potentially biasing
influence may be a necessary, but not sufficient, condition to actually result in bias. Also, the definition
offered in the exposure draft requires a complete specification of the "pressures and other factors" to give it
meaning whereas the above definition is complete in and of itself.
As noted in paragraphs #37-39 the personal attributes approach adopted places a focus on the
individual auditor rather than an enumeration of the various relationships that might lead to a compromise
of independence. The suggested definition is more consistent with the adopted approach. Efforts to
combine an operational definition of independence with a "genus and difference" definition risks
conflicting extensions of the definition itself. Thus, one may conclude that an auditor is independent by
virtue of having none of the enumerated and prohibited relationships while an as yet unspecified
relationship may be a substantial Bias Factor. Although ED #49 seems to sanction an operational
definition of independence when it states:
An auditor is independent when independence risk is at an acceptably
low level, as determined by a particular independence decision maker.
such a definition seems more consistent with a rules approach to defining independence than to the
personal attributes approach. This statement provides an operational definition of independence as
opposed to a conceptual one. It is the equivalent of explaining a straight line as the result of placing a ruler
on a page and drawing a pencil along one side.
Furthermore, as observed in the exposure draft complete freedom from potentially biasing
conditions is an impossible state of affairs considering the client fee payment arrangement. As Mautz and
Sharaf also observe the very institutional arrangements or environment in which the auditor performs his
work contaminates his independence in the minds of users.vii These institutional factors may be as
significant to the user's evaluation of auditor independence as any potentially compromising personal
factors. The ED definition, therefore, is unattainable whereas the one suggested is at least conceptually
achievable, a desired condition as stated in ED paragraph #41. In addition, a definition such as that
suggested offers a concept to which anyone involved in any attest engagement, whether a public company
or not, could subscribe. Although not the ISBs obligation internal consistency with other pronouncements
and standards would, nevertheless, seem a desirable property.
Profession Reference:
Whether this pillar of the profession is significant to a user is a matter of argument. Conventional
wisdom holds that it is independence of the audit that gives value to the auditor's opinion. The idea of
auditor independence is so ingrained that it's significance is never examined. As Mautz and Scharaf note:
The significance of independence in the work of the independent auditor is
so well established that little justification is needed to establish this concept
as one of the cornerstones in any structure of auditing theory.viii
However, it may instead be that the value added by an audit opinion is derived from an
existence of auditing standards as they apply to the application of auditing procedures coupled with
the legal implications for failure to observe them. Again, as Melancon notes the SEC has never brought
an action for a lack of independence, only for substandard audit work.ix It should be observed that the
mere presence of independence in and of itself is no defense against a failure to perform required audit
procedures satisfactorily. Instead it merely asserts that in the absence of motive the auditor may be
presumed to have performed his job for the benefit of the user. It hardly matters to a user that his loses

were the result o f an independent auditor doing his work poorly or from an auditor lacking independence
doing his work poorly. Either way he will look to the legal system for a redress of grievances.
As useful as this presumption of independence may be for refuting legal claims it may not be as
critical to the profession as conventional wisdom would lead one to believe. For example, investors have
always committed large sums of money to investments on the basis of broker recommendations. However,
it is well known that broker's have no requirement of independence.
Legal Dimensions:
finally, a focus on "mental attitude" may preserve for the auditor a defense against a prima facia
case established by a claimant arising from a difference in the risk assessment of a potentially biasing
condition. The traditions of our legal system place the burden of proof on a claimant in cases of
negligence. Violation of an auditor's professional duty to provide an objective application of auditing
procedures should remain the standard of proof rather than a mere appearance of compromised
independence resulting from a violation of an independence rule. An accidental or unknown violation
could expose the auditor to liability when in fact he has performed a "quality audit."
Terminology:
"Threats" is a term filled with negative emotional implications. "Bias Factors" or some other term with a
more benign connotation would be preferable. As Kemeny states, "A philosopher is supposed to be free of
emotions, and hence philosophical discussions are supposed to avoid such words."x It would seem this
same criterion ought to apply to any conceptual model developed by the ISB.

i Douglas Carmichael, CPA Journal, May 1999
ii Robert Mautz and Hussein Sharaf, The Philosophy of Auditing, American Accounting Association,
1961, p. 206
iii Shane Moriarty, "Trends in Ethical Sanctions Within the Accounting Profession," Accounting Horizons,
December 2000.
iv Barry Melancon, "The Proposed SEC Rule on Auditor Independence and its Consequences", Journal of
Accountancy, October 2000, p. 26 - 28. It should be noted that a lack of auditor independence may
correlate highly with a substandard performance of audit procedures. Since evidence of the later may be
more relevant to a proof of injury by a claimant than a lack of independence it may be that the quality of
the audit has been the subject of SEC actions although the substandard audit may have stemmed from a
lack of independence. There is currently no evidence to my knowledge to support either position.
v Introduction to Logic, 7th Edition, Irving Copi, p. 161
vi Morris Cohen and Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and the Scientific Method, (Harcourt, Brace
& World, 1934), pp. 223-244
vii Robert Mautz and Hussein Sharaf, The Philosophy of Auditing, American Accounting Association,
1961, pp. 210-211.
viii Mautz and Sharaf, p. 204
ix Barry Melancon
x John Kemeny, A Philospher Looks at Science, (D. Van Nostrand Co, 1959), p.5
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To: isb@cpaindependence.org
cc:
Subject: FEE Ethics Working Party - Comment letter on your Exposure Draft
ED 00-2: Statement of Independence Concepts ? A Conceptual
Framework for Auditor Independence

Please see after the commenting letter from the Ethics Working Party of the
European Federation of Accountants (FEE) on ED 00-2. A formal letter will
also follow by post.
Best regards,
Helene Parent
FEE Director of Regulatory Affairs
1/4
Brussels, 16 February 2001
Independence Standards Board
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY
10036-8775
USA
Dear Madam, dear Sir,
Re:
Exposure Draft ED 00-2:
Statement of Independence Concepts ? A
Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence
The

Federation

June

2000

subject

des

Experts Comptables Europeens (FEE) wrote to you on 6

relating

to the Discussion Memorandum you issued on the above

and we are pleased to have the opportunity to submit our comments

on the Exposure Draft.

We

very

much welcome the Board's work advocating the use of a conceptual

framework

in the determination of guidance on auditor independence. As we

explained

in

more detail in our letter of seven months ago, the use of a

conceptual approach underpins FEE'S own Common Core of Principles, set out
in

1998.

The

Commission,
independence,
global

International
in

have

economy,

consideration

the

of

current
since

Federation
drafts

of

of Accountants and the European
their

forthcoming

papers

on

adopted a similar approach. In an increasingly

international harmonisation is an important goal and the
the

conceptual

framework

in

the context of the U.S.

auditor independence code will greatly assist in this process.

We

set

out

below some general observations on key aspects of the paper,

together with some specific comments following up some of our responses to
the questions posed in the Discussion Memorandum.

General observations
Firstly,
the

we

wonder whether the four basic guidelines needed to implement

conceptual framework are best described as 'principles'. In our view,

the principles are the underlying requirements that auditors perform their
work with objectivity and professional integrity. The conceptual framework
of

assessment

of

threats

and

safeguards is a means to achieving those

principles.
The

section

of

the

Exposure

Draft

on

the consideration of costs and

benefits

raises an important question and your paper considers the nature

of

of

some

the

independence.
benefits

costs

We

entirely

should

reasonable

to

independence

and

benefits
agree

with

likely
the

to

result

conclusion

from
that

auditor
costs and

be considered: independence cannot be absolute and it is
consider

that

proportionality

is

costs and benefits when determining the level of
acceptable.

should

be

In

this

connection,

the concept of

observed. This concept when applied to law or

regulation requires that the effect of the law or regulation on the market
place

should be "proportionate" to the objective of protecting the public

interest.

However,

the

analysis

of

costs

and

benefits should not be

overcomplicated.

Another
is

best

issue
placed

considering

the

that we believe could usefully be developed further is who
to

apply

benefits

the framework. We believe there are merits in
of

placing

the responsibility for making the

decision on whether to undertake the engagement on the auditor alone. This
is considered further below.

In

the

context

definitions

and

of
the

international

harmonisation,

we

suggest

that the

terminology should be revisited and adapted so that

there is as much consistency as possible with the definitions used by IFAC
in

its

ED

on

Independence and the EU in its proposed recommendation on

statutory auditors' independence. The latter paper can be found at:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/company/audit/news/indintro.htm

Comments

on

the

resolution

of

certain issues raised in the Discussion

Memorandum (DM 00-1)
Introduction ? Scope and content
FEE

is

concerned

paragraph

2

and

independence
words

to

rules,

and

is

effect.

that

the

where

also

conceptual
other

framework

contexts,

as

a

is

referred

tool

for

to, in

resolving

"in the absence of ISB standards or other rules", or
A

independence

situations
FEE

the

several

issues

that

imaginable

that

reader

problems

should

conceptual

such

could

get

the

impression

that all

ideally be covered by detailed

framework

is intended for use only in

rules are not (yet) in place. For similar reasons

concerned

over

the

definition

of 'independence decision

maker'. The definition includes individual auditors in assessing their own
independence and in making decisions 'when faced with situations for which
there
its

is neither authoritative guidance nor firm policy'. As FEE noted in
response

checklists

to

may

independence

the

Discussion

foster

a

Memorandum,

mechanical

requirements. Auditors

"the

attitude
and

use

towards

of

casuistic

compliance with

supervisory bodies may get the

false impression that if all the detailed prohibitions have been observed,
independence

issues

need

no

more attention." In fact, this weakness of

detailed rules is indirectly admitted in paragraph 6 of the ED.

In

FEE'S

auditor

opinion
as

framework
infinite

the

variety
to

consider

saying

that

whether

or

rules,

framework should serve the individual

tool for resolving all independence issues. In the

adopted internationally, the ability to cater for the
of

individual

circumstances that arise in practice is

be best served by placing the onus on the auditor actively
independence

issues

the

must

not

however,

situation

conceptual

main

approach

considered
to

the

that

auditor
he

finds

should
is

comply

each
with

engagement. It goes without
any existing prohibitions,

them appropriate in the individual case. Such

never

covered

for

by

be

regarded

as

exhaustive.

Even

in a

detailed rules the auditor has to use an

analytical approach in accordance with the framework model to identify any

threats

to

independence

that

are not anticipated by the rules. In such

circumstances, it must of course be incumbent on the auditor to be able to
demonstrate that a responsible conclusion has been reached, assisting with
the

quality

regulator
only

to

specific

insurance that is necessary to retain public confidence. The

should
give

complement the conceptual framework with detailed rules

guidance

situations,

on

the application of the general principles to

such as prohibitions where no other safeguard would

be acceptable.

Goal of auditor independence
The

Introduction

statutory
protect

audit
the

enterprises

to
was

interests
and,

more

FEE'S

own Common Core of Principles notes that the

introduced
of

into

shareholders

generally,

the

the

legal framework in Europe to

and
public

of

other

stakeholders in

at large. We support the

adoption of an outward-looking goal: independence is not an end in itself,
but a means to an end.

Defining auditor independence

We

agree that it is appropriate to consider independence of appearance as

well

as

independence

of

mind.

The

draft

European

Union

document

Consultative Paper on Statutory Auditors' Independence in the E U : A Set of
Fundamental

Principles,

adopting

a

definition

similar

to that in the

Common Core of Principles, considers that independence should address:

°
"Independence of mind, i.e. the state of mind which has regard to all
considerations relevant to the task in hand, but no others; and
°
Independence in appearance, i.e. the avoidance of facts and
circumstances which are so significant that a reasonable and informed
third party would question the Statutory Auditor’s ability to act
objectively."
We

are

concerned,

unrealistic

that

degree

of

your

definition

absoluteness

to

will

be

taken

independence:

a

to

imply an

fear that you

express yourselves in Appendix C.

Basic

Principles

of

Auditor

Independence

?

Analysing

Threats

and

safeguards
In

the

level

section
of

the

'independence
affected

concerning the determination of the acceptability of the
independence

decision

risk,

makers

it

is mentioned in paragraph 26 that

should

identify the individual or groups

by threats to auditor independence and the significance of those

threats'. To that end, FEE in its commenting letter on DM-001, categorised
three
the

groups
outcome

of individuals in the audit firm whose ability to influence
of the audit varies substantially. We consider that it would

be helpful to introduce a categorisation of this sort into your document.

Basic

Principles

of

Auditor

Independence

?

Considering Stakeholders'

Perceptions
In

FEE'S

whilst
paper

the

response

to

importance

the
of

Discussion

Memorandum, it was observed that

stakeholder

perceptions is acknowledged, the

did not deal enough with what their perceptions are. We welcome the

further analysis and definitions of who these stakeholders might be in the
ED, but regret that no additional comments are made on those perceptions.

Again,

we

paradigms

suggest
of

that

stakeholder

ISB

considers

engagement

in

the new and radically different
the emerging fields of social,

environmental and sustainability reporting.

We

would

be

pleased

to

be of any assistance to you in respect of this

project and in particular, any issues raised by this letter.

Yours sincerely,

Dr. Harald Ring
Chairman,
FEE Ethics Working Party

THE

IN S T IT U T E

OF

IN T E R N A L

Professional
Development

A U D IT O R S

William G. Bishop III, CIA

President
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Research
Foundation
Certified
Internal Auditor ®

February 16, 2001

Arthur Siegel, Executive Director
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775

Dear Art:
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Independence Standards Board’s (ISB)
Exposure Draft (ED) on Statement o f Independence Concepts - A Conceptual
Framework fo r Auditor Independence (ED 00-2). The Institute o f Internal Auditors (IIA)
supports the development o f a conceptual framework for auditor independence that will
help the ISB issue principles-based independence standards for auditors o f public
companies. Our comments to the questions raised in the exposure draft are as follows:
1. Definition of Auditor Independence
The definition of auditor independence contained in paragraph four may be flawed in
that ‘f reedom from those pressures ” seems to denote an absolute. The next sentence
modifies the definition so as not to imply that an auditor must be free from all
pressures. Paragraph six states that, “an auditor must be able, and be reasonably
expected to be able, to overcome pressures and other factors that would prevent
unbiased audit decisions.” Clearly, the document states that the definition o f
independence cannot be the absolute freedom from pressures.
The International Federation o f Accountants (IFAC) issued a draft revision to their
Code of Ethics concerning independence. They do not define independence on its
own (Section 8.3) because the definition can create misunderstandings. Rather they
state (section 8.2) that the reporting accountant (auditor) must be both independent of
mind and independent in appearance. They define both as follows:
249 M aitland Avenue
Altam onte Springs,
Florida 32701-4201
U.S.A.

tel 407 830-7600
fax 407 831-5171
email wbishop@theiia.org

•

Independent o f Mind - “The state o f mind that permits the provision o f an opinion
without being affected by the influences that impair professional judgment; when
used in conjunction with the independence required o f a reporting accountant
(auditor), it includes the qualities o f integrity, objectivity and professional
skepticism.

•

Independence in Appearance- The ability to demonstrate that risks to
independence o f mind have been eliminated, or limited to such clearly
insignificant matters, so that an informed third party (investors) would not
reasonably question the reporting accountant’s objectivity.

We recommend that a format and concept similar to IFAC’s be used in place o f the
definition o f independence exposed by the ISB.

2. Goal of Auditor Independence
We agree that the goals are appropriate.

3. & 4. Concepts and Basic Principles of Auditor Independence
We believe that the concepts and basic principles are appropriate and will provide
a framework for evaluating auditor independence.

5. Other Issues
We do not believe there are other issues that should be addressed.

Established in 1941, the Institute of Internal Auditors is an international professional
organization with world headquarters in Altamonte Springs, Florida. The IIA has over
70,000 members in internal auditing, governance, internal control, IT audit, education
and security. Many o f our members share membership with professional accountancy
bodies throughout the world. With representation from more than 100 countries, the
Institute is the acknowledged leader in standards, certification, education, research and
technological guidance for the profession worldwide.
Again, thank you for this opportunity to provide the Institute's comments on this
exposure draft. If the IIA can provide further assistance please feel free to contact me.
Sincerely,

11
[ABA LETTERHEAD]

February 23, 2001
E-mail: isb@cpaindependence.org
Independence Standards Board
6th Floor
1211 Avenue o f the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Attention: ED 00-2
Re: Exposure Draft (ED 00-2) Statement o f Independence Concepts, A
Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence (November 2000)
Dear Members and Staff:
We are pleased to submit this letter o f comments on ED 00-2 on behalf o f the
Committee o f Law and Accounting, Section o f Business Law, American Bar
Association. Our letter was prepared by a drafting group comprised o f members
o f our Committee. Those other members o f our Committee who reviewed drafts
o f our letter, which were widely circulated through our Committee’s listserv, were
in general agreement with our letter. However, our letter does not reflect the
official views o f our Committee, the Section o f Business Law or the American
Bar Association.
Introduction
We agree with the Board’s conceptual goal “to support user reliance on the
financial reporting process and to enhance capital market efficiency.” We also
agree that auditor independence is critical to achieving that goal.
Discussion
The Board proposes to define auditor independence as “freedom from those
pressures and factors that compromise, or can reasonably be expected to
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compromise, an auditor’s ability to make audit decisions”. However, the Board
does not propose that independence or lack o f independence in fact be determined.
Rather, the Board proposes a “threats/safeguards” approach, which would require
an assessment o f “independence risk” by “independence decision makers”.
Under ED 00-2, “independence risk” is “the risk that threats to auditor
independence, to the extent that they are not mitigated by safeguards,
compromise, or can reasonably be expected to compromise, an auditor’s ability to
make unbiased audit decisions”.
We recognize that ED 00-2 is a proposal to establish a conceptual framework for
auditor independence and we do not disagree with the Board’s approach.
Nevertheless, we believe that any standards developed within the proposed
framework must be clear and workable in practice. We address some o f our
concerns in this regard below.
One aspect o f the Board’s approach that troubles us is that it would establish an
objective standard- “whether well informed investors and other users o f financial
statements would reasonably consider the activities, relationships, or other
circumstances in question as precluding independence.” However, in practice, this
standard may be applied subjectively by auditors, in the first instance, and then by
“independence decision makers”, including audit committee members. We are
concerned that this could result in greater exposure to audit committee members
when a tribunal applies an objective standard to an essentially subjective decision.
If the audit committee is an independence decision maker, relied upon by
investors and other users o f financial statements to make independence decisions,
there must be clear and workable criteria that they can apply and may rely on to
protect them from liability for reasonable judgments made in good faith.
Accordingly, we urge that any implementing standards provide audit committee
members with objective criteria to look to in applying this standard.
We also believe that any implementing standards should draw a better line
between inappropriate advocacy by independent auditors and their appropriate
support o f a client’s position on accounting matters.
Further, we believe that the threat to independence from an auditor’s desire to
preserve the audit engagement to earn audit fees, which the Board recognizes,
should be addressed in any implementing standards.
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We thank the Board for the opportunity to submit our comments on ED 00-2.
Members o f our Committee would be available if the Board wishes to discuss our
conclusions and suggestions.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Richard H. Rowe
Richard H. Rowe
Chair, Committee on law and Accounting

Drafting Group:
Richard H. Rowe
Dan L. Goldwasser
cc:

Dan L. Goldwasser
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bcc:

Gwen Quillen
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Independence Standards Board
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY
10036-8775
USA

Dear Madam, dear Sir,
Re: Exposure Draft ED 00-2: Statement o f Independence Concepts - A Conceptual Framework
for Auditor Independence
The Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens (FEE) wrote to you on 6 June 2000 relating to
the Discussion Memorandum you issued on the above subject and we are pleased to have the
opportunity to submit our comments on the Exposure Draft.

We very much welcome the Board’s work advocating the use of a conceptual framework in the
determination of guidance on auditor independence. As we explained in more detail in our letter of
seven months ago, the use of a conceptual approach underpins FEE’s own Common Core of
Principles, set out in 1998. The International Federation of Accountants and the European
Commission, in the current drafts of their forthcoming papers on independence, have since
adopted a similar approach. In an increasingly global economy, international harmonisation is an
important goal and the consideration of the conceptual framework in the context of the U.S.
auditor independence code will greatly assist in this process.
We set out below some general observations on key aspects of the paper, together with some
specific comments following up some of our responses to the questions posed in the Discussion
Memorandum.

General observations
Firstly, we wonder whether the four basic guidelines needed to implement the conceptual
framework are best described as ‘principles’. In our view, the principles are the underlying
requirements that auditors perform their work with objectivity and professional integrity. The
conceptual framework of assessment of threats and safeguards is a means to achieving those
principles.
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The section of the Exposure Draft on the consideration of costs and benefits raises an important
question and your paper considers the nature of some of the costs and benefits likely to result from
auditor independence. We entirely agree with the conclusion that costs and benefits should be
considered: independence cannot be absolute and it is reasonable to consider costs and benefits
when determining the level of independence that is acceptable. In this connection, the concept of
proportionality should be observed. This concept when applied to law or regulation requires that
the effect of the law or regulation on the market place should be “proportionate” to the objective of
protecting the public interest. However, the analysis of costs and benefits should not be
overcomplicated.

Another issue that we believe could usefully be developed further is who is best placed to apply
the framework. We believe there are merits in considering the benefits of placing the responsibility
for making the decision on whether to undertake the engagement on the auditor alone. This is
considered further below.

In the context of international harmonisation, we suggest that the definitions and the terminology
should be revisited and adapted so that there is as much consistency as possible with the
definitions used by IFAC in its ED on Independence and the EU in its proposed recommendation
on statutory auditors’ independence. The latter paper can be found at:
http://europa.eu. int/comm/internal_market/en/company/audit/news/indintro.htm

Comments on the resolution o f certain issues raised in the Discussion Memorandum (DM 00-1)
Introduction - Scope and content
FEE is concerned that the conceptual framework is referred to, in paragraph 2 and several other
contexts, as a tool for resolving independence issues “in the absence of ISB standards or other
rules”, or words to that effect. A reader could get the impression that all imaginable independence
problems should ideally be covered by detailed rules, and that the conceptual framework is
intended for use only in situations where such rules are not (yet) in place. For similar reasons FEE
is also concerned over the definition of ‘independence decision maker’. The definition includes
individual auditors in assessing their own independence and in making decisions ‘when faced with
situations for which there is neither authoritative guidance nor firm policy’. As FEE noted in its
response to the Discussion Memorandum, “the use of casuistic checklists may foster a mechanical
attitude towards compliance with independence requirements. Auditors and supervisory bodies
may get the false impression that if all the detailed prohibitions have been observed, independence
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issues need no more attention.” In fact, this weakness of detailed rules is indirectly admitted in
paragraph 6 of the ED.

In FEE’S opinion the conceptual framework should serve the individual auditor as the main tool
for resolving all independence issues. In the framework approach adopted internationally, the
ability to cater for the infinite variety of individual circumstances that arise in practice is
considered to be best served by placing the onus on the auditor actively to consider independence
issues for each engagement. It goes without saying that the auditor must comply with any existing
prohibitions, whether or not he finds them appropriate in the individual case. Such rules, however,
should never be regarded as exhaustive. Even in a situation that is covered by detailed rules the
auditor has to use an analytical approach in accordance with the framework model to identify any
threats to independence that are not anticipated by the rules. In such circumstances, it must of
course be incumbent on the auditor to be able to demonstrate that a responsible conclusion has
been reached, assisting with the quality insurance that is necessary to retain public confidence. The
regulator should complement the conceptual framework with detailed rules only to give guidance
on the application of the general principles to specific situations, such as prohibitions where no
other safeguard would be acceptable.

Goal of auditor independence
The Introduction to FEE’s own Common Core of Principles notes that the statutory audit was
introduced into the legal framework in Europe to protect the interests of shareholders and of other
stakeholders in enterprises and, more generally, the public at large. We support the adoption of an
outward-looking goal: independence is not an end in itself, but a means to an end.

Defining auditor independence
We agree that it is appropriate to consider independence of appearance as well as independence of
mind. The draft European Union document1, adopting a definition similar to that in the Common
Core of Principles, considers that independence should address:

°

“Independence of mind, i.e. the state of mind which has regard to all considerations relevant to
the task in hand, but no others; and

°

Independence in appearance, i.e. the avoidance of facts and circumstances which are so
significant that a reasonable and informed third party would question the Statutory Auditor’s
ability to act objectively.”

1Consultative Paper on Statutory Auditors’ Independence in the EU: A Set of Fundamental Principles
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We are concerned, that your definition will be taken to imply an unrealistic degree of absoluteness
to independence: a fear that you express yourselves in Appendix C.

Basic Principles of Auditor Independence - Analysing Threats and safeguards
In the section concerning the determination of the acceptability of the level of the independence
risk, it is mentioned in paragraph 26 that ‘independence decision makers should identify the
individual or groups affected by threats to auditor independence and the significance of those
threats’. To that end, FEE in its commenting letter on DM-001, categorised three groups of
individuals in the audit firm whose ability to influence the outcome of the audit varies
substantially. We consider that it would be helpful to introduce a categorisation of this sort into
your document.

Basic Principles of Auditor Independence - Considering Stakeholders’ Perceptions
In FEE’S response to the Discussion Memorandum, it was observed that whilst the importance of
stakeholder perceptions is acknowledged, the paper did not deal enough with what their
perceptions are. We welcome the further analysis and definitions of who these stakeholders might
be in the ED, but regret that no additional comments are made on those perceptions.

Again, we suggest that ISB considers the new and radically different paradigms of stakeholder
engagement in the emerging fields of social, environmental and sustainability reporting.

We would be pleased to be of any assistance to you in respect of this project and in particular, any
issues raised by this letter.

Yours sincerely,

Dr Harald Ring
Chairman
FEE Ethics Working Party
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AICPA

PCPS
February 28, 2001
Susan McGrath, CPA
Director
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Re:

Independence Standards Board (ISB) Exposure Draft (ED 00-02) Statement of
Independence Concepts - A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence

Dear Ms. McGrath:
One of the objectives that the Council of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
established for the PCPS Executive Committee is to act as an advocate for all local and
regional firms and represent those firms’ interests on professional issues, primarily through the
Technical Issues Committee (“TIC”). This communication is in accordance with that objective.
These comments, however, do not necessarily express the positions of the AICPA.
TIC has reviewed the above referenced exposure draft (“ED”) and is providing the following
comments for your consideration.
Issue 1: DEFINITION OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
The proposed conceptual framework defines auditor independence as “freedom from
those pressures and other factors that compromise, or can reasonably be expected to
compromise, an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions. ”
TIC agrees with the definition of auditor independence as stated in the ED and is pleased with
the approach taken to address the “appearance of independence” issue.
Issue 2: GOAL OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
The proposed conceptual framework states that the goal o f auditor independence is “to
support user reliance on the financial reporting process and to enhance capital market
efficiency. ”
TIC believes the goal of auditor independence is appropriate as stated.
Issue 3: CONCEPTS AND BASIC PRINCIPLES OF AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE
Are the concepts and basic principles appropriate and sufficiently operational? If not,
what changes would you suggest, and why?
TIC believes that more specific guidance should be provided regarding the definition of self
review threats in paragraph 12b. TIC believes that, without further clarification, the scope of

American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Harborside Financial Center, 201 Plaza Three, Jersey City, NJ 07311-3881 • 1 800 CPA FIRM • fax (201) 938-3404

Partnering for CPA Practice Success • The AICPA Alliance for CPA Firms

Susan McGrath, CPA
February 28, 2001
Page 2
the definition may be misinterpreted. Paragraph 12b currently defines self-review threats as
“threats that arise from auditors reviewing their own work or the work done by others in their
firm.” TIC identified two possible interpretations of the definition:
1. an auditor’s review of the working papers prepared by staff or contract employees for an
audit engagement (a quality control issue)
2. an auditor’s review of the work of others in his/her own firm that have performed nonaudit
services for a client (an independence issue).
TIC understands the ISB’s intention was to limit the definition of self-review threats to the
independence context only. To avoid additional confusion, TIC recommends, at a minimum,
that clarifying language be substituted for the word “work” and that examples be given to
illustrate the scope of the definition.

Other Issues: APPLICABILITY OF CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
TIC noted that the scope paragraph from the conceptual framework DM 00-1, paragraph 2,
seems to have been omitted entirely from the ED. TIC believes that the Statement of
Independence Concepts should include a scope paragraph to state the applicability of the
conceptual framework. TIC understands that the ISB’s mandate is to set standards for auditors
who are required to meet SEC independence requirements. However, since TIC believes that
there should be no conceptual differences between audits of public and private firms, TIC
recommends the inclusion of a scope paragraph that encourages all firms to adopt the
Statement o f Independence Concepts - A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence.
TIC appreciates the opportunity to present these comments on behalf of PCPS member firms.
We would be pleased to discuss our comments with you at your convenience.
Sincerely,

Candace Wright, Chair
PCPS Technical Issues Committee
cc: PCPS Executive and Technical Issues Committees
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ACCA is the largest global professional accountancy body, with
250,000 members and students in 160 countries. ACCA's headquarters
are in London and it has 28 staffed offices around the world. The
ACCA syllabus has been recognised by the United Nations as
providing the basis for a global accountancy qualification. ACCA's
mission is to provide quality professional opportunities to people of
ability and application, to be a leader in the development of the
global accountancy profession, to promote the highest ethical and
governance standards and to work in the public interest.
Further information on ACCA is available on ACCA's website,
www.accaglobal.com.
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Executive Summary
The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA) is
pleased to have the opportunity to comment on Exposure Draft ED
00-2 Statement Of Independence Concepts A Conceptual
Framework For Auditor Independence (the proposed Statement)
issued by the Independence Standards Board (ISB).
ACCA welcomes the proposed Statement as it embodies a
framework approach to independence. This consideration of threats
and safeguards is inherently superior to a rules based approach and is
supported by the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), the
European Union, ACCA and many other professional bodies.
In our view, the most important step which can be taken to serve the
public interest and protect and promote investors’ confidence in
securities markets is the adoption of an appropriate approach to
auditor independence which is consistent worldwide. In order to
achieve this, we consider that it is imperative that ISB repositions the
proposed Statement and its extant Standards to align with the
relevant aspects of the IFAC Code of Ethics for Professional
Accountants (the IFAC Code of Ethics).
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1

General Comments
Status of the Independence Standards Board

1.1

With the exception of the proposed Statement, ISB has deferred
development of its pronouncements. We understand that this
action has been taken as a result of the separate decision of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to modernise its
auditor independence requirements (Rule 2-01). We assume,
therefore, that ISB and its stakeholders will reconsider its mission
in the light of these circumstances. In this regard, we would like
to highlight the following structural matters.

1.2

Historically, the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA) has acted as both professional body and
standard setter. To an extent, for public companies, the SEC
has acted as both a regulator and a standard setter. We
suggest that ISB has not been able fully to establish itself as an
independent standard setter because:
• ISB is concerned with independence rather than the whole
range of professional ethics
• ISB is concerned only with auditors of public companies
and
• ISB is not independent of the profession (there is no majority
of lay members on its Board).
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Consistent worldwide approach to independence
1.3

The IFAC Ethics Committee is currently developing revised
material for the independence aspects of the IFAC Code of
Ethics. We strongly suggest that the proposed Statement should
be aligned with that material since, when it is finalised, it will
have worldwide authoritative status.

1.4

The principal advantages of aligning the proposed Statement
to the finalised IFAC Code of Ethics are that:
• a consistent worldwide approach to auditor
independence will best serve the public interest and
protect and promote investors’ confidence in securities
markets
• benchmarking of US requirements to best international
standards will protect and promote US investor confidence
• there is greater likelihood of auditor compliance with US
independence requirements when these are familiar
because they are equivalent to requirements in other
jurisdictions (for example, where an overseas subsidiary of a
US corporation has local auditors)
and
• compliance with US independence requirements may be
enforced through accountancy bodies which promulgate
the IFAC Code of Ethics and which have the power to
discipline members in all jurisdictions.
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Effect on the proposed Statement of the mission of the
Independence Standards Board
1.5

The foreword to the proposed Statement notes that:
The mission of the independence Standards Board (ISB or Board)
is to establish independence standards applicable to the audits
of public entities in order to serve the public interest and to
protect and promote investors’ confidence in the securities
markets. One of the Board’s most fundamental projects since its
establishment has been the development of a conceptual
framework for auditor independence to help the Board issue
principles-based independence standards for auditors of public
companies.

1.6

The mission and the proposed Statement may be contrasted
with the pronouncements (and proposed pronouncements) of
other bodies dealing with professional ethics. Because of its
importance, we restrict our comparative analysis to differences
between the proposed Statement and the IFAC Code of Ethics.

1.7

In two respects, the proposed Statement may be seen to have
a narrower focus than the IFAC Exposure Draft ‘Independence
Proposed Changes to the Code of Ethics for Professional
Accountants’ (the proposed IFAC Ethics Code):
• the proposed Statement focuses on audits, whereas the
proposed IFAC Ethics Code deals with assurance
engagements which are wider in their application (as
defined in International Standard on Auditing 100
‘Assurance Engagements’)
and
• the proposed Statement focuses on the audit of public
entities, whereas the proposed IFAC Ethics Code is
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applicable to public and non-public entities alike.
1.8

In our comments at paragraph 1.2 above, we drew attention to
the effect that this narrow focus could have on the ability of ISB
fully to establish itself as an independent standard setter.

1.9

In one significant regard, however, the proposed Statement is
much less clearly focused than the proposed IFAC Ethics Code.
The objective of the proposed IFAC Ethics Code is to assist
reporting accountants in decision making with regard to
independence. The proposed Statement explains, however,
that its principal purposes are:
a. to help the Independence Standards Board (ISB or Board)
meet its responsibilities to set sound and consistent
standards by providing direction and structure for resolving
independence issues
b. to assist other independence decision makers in resolving
questions about independence in the absence of ISB
standards and other independence rules
c. to help investors, other users of financial information, and
other interested parties understand the nature,
significance, and limitations of auditor independence
and
d. to focus debate and serve as a boundary for discussions
about auditor independence issues, thereby helping
interested parties contribute to the development and
application of, and better understand the rationale and
process underlying, ISB standards.
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1.10

The term ‘independence decision makers’ is defined in the
Glossary as follows:
‘Individuals, groups, and entities that make judgments about
auditor independence issues. Independence decision makers
include:
- the ISB and other independence standard setters
- auditing firms in adopting independence policies and
procedures in the absence of existing rules or standards
- individual auditors in assessing their own independence
and in making decisions when faced with situations for
which there is neither authoritative guidance nor firm policy
- the management, audit committees, and boards of
directors of auditees in meeting their responsibilities to
retain auditors who ore independent
- regulators in meeting their responsibilities to ensure the
independence of auditors.’

1.11

This wide focus has devalued the document by making it less
directly relevant to auditors. For example, the discussion of
assessing the level of independence risk and determining its
acceptability (paragraphs 22 to 26) should be of the utmost
practical importance to auditors. However, the discussion is
highly theoretical and hedged with modifying words. The table
at paragraph 23, which is not used in the succeeding argument,
describes a level of independence risk as ‘no independence
risk’ and then suggests only that ‘compromised objectivity is
virtually impossible' (emphasis added).

1.12

By contrast, the IFAC Code of Ethics deals with practical
decision points in an assessment: threats are either ‘clearly
insignificant’ or safeguards must be considered, safeguards
must be put in place to reduce significant threats to an
‘acceptable level', but some threats are so significant that no
safeguard is appropriate except refusal of the engagement.
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1.13

We see no easy solution to the conflict between the desire of ISB
to produce a conceptual framework for auditor independence
to inform a wide spectrum of independence decision makers
and the needs of firms and auditors when faced with situations
for which there are no existing rules, standards or guidance. We
believe that it places too great a demand on the proposed
Statement fully to fulfil these principal purposes. We
recommend, therefore, that the proposed Statement is
addressed only to independence decision makers other than
auditors. The practical needs of firms and auditors would be
best met by ISB adopting and promulgating the IFAC Code of
Ethics. To do this, it is necessary to align the terminology and
concepts in the proposed Statement with those in the IFAC
Code of Efhics.
Independence standards

1.14

In our comments above, we have argued that the proposed
Statement should be aligned with the IFAC Code of Ethics first,
to promote global consistency and, secondly, as a necessary
consequence of its use to meet the practical needs of auditors.
The IFAC Code of Ethics is intended to serve as the only
mandatory pronouncement for independence: there are no
separate ‘standards'. This is in contrast to the ISB regime, where
the Conceptual Framework does not itself establish rules.

1.15

We recognise that in the US environment greater emphasis is
placed on rules and standards than is now the case in many
other developed economies. Accordingly, we hesitate to
suggest that ISB withdraws its extant Standards. It may be
possible to continue to issue pronouncements as Standards
which are, to all intents and purposes, the same as the analysis
of specific situations in the IFAC Code of Ethics.
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2

Comments on Specific
Questions
Our comments on the specific questions set out in the preface
to the proposed Statement are given below:
Definition of auditor independence
The proposed conceptual framework defines auditor
independence as ‘freedom from those pressures and other
factors that compromise, or can reasonably be expected to
compromise, an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit
decisions.’ The definition and the basis for the Board’s
conclusions are discussed in paragraphs 3-7 and 37-46. The
other components of the conceptual framework are intended to
help independence decision makers apply the definition to a
wide variety of auditor independence issues. Is the definition
appropriate? If not, what changes would you suggest, and
why?

2.1

We suggest that the definition is made the same as that in the
IFAC Code of Ethics when finalised. The proposed IFAC Code of
Ethics draws attention to the danger of using the word
‘independence’ on its own as that may lead to an unrealistic
expectation that there is some state of absolute independence.

Page 10

Goal of auditor independence
The proposed conceptual framework states that the goal of
auditor independence is “to support user reliance on the
financial reporting process and to enhance capital market
efficiency.” The goal and the basis for the Board’s conclusions
are discussed in paragraphs 8-9 and 47-48. Is the goal
appropriate? If not what changes would you suggest and
why?
2.2

A conceptual framework for financial reporting necessarily
addresses the purpose of financial statements. It is only by
establishing the purpose of such reports that a suitable frame of
reference can be created to allow accounting standards
consistent with it to determine an appropriate form and content
for reporting. The purpose of independence is, however, bound
up with the purpose of auditing which is in turn bound up with
the purpose of financial reporting. The proposed Statement
suggests that the goal of independence is ‘to support user
reliance on the financial reporting process and to enhance
capital market efficiency.’ This goal could equally apply to
auditing itself and, arguably, to the issue of financial statements.
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Concepts and basic principles of auditor independence
The proposed conceptual framework contains basic principles
related to four concepts of auditor independence: threats,
safeguards, independence risk, and significance of
threats/effectiveness of safeguards. The concepts, basic
principles, and the basis for the Board’s conclusions are
discussed in paragraphs 10-32 and 49-60. The concepts and
basic principles contained in the proposed framework are
intended to serve as guidelines for independence decision
makers to analyze and resolve independence issues. Are the
concepts and basic principles appropriate and sufficiently
operational? If not, what changes would you suggest, and
why?
2.3

We consider the four concepts in the proposed Statement to be
valid. However, while there is an obvious need for the concepts
of threat and safeguard, we consider independence risk and
the significance of threats/effectiveness of safeguards to be
derived concepts and to be of little practical worth over and
above their natural descriptive language. Threats and
safeguards are important classes of objects and are worthy of
enumeration. The other two concepts are not necessary. A
semantic argument could be advanced that ‘independence
risk' is equivalent to ‘independence threat’ and so presenting
the two as separate invites confusion. The IFAC Code of Ethics
deals only with ‘risks to independence’ and ‘safeguards'.
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Paragraphs 49-53 describe the elements of a risk model for
auditor independence in which independence risk is a function
of the significance of threats to auditor independence and the
effectiveness of safeguards to auditor independence. What are
your views on the appropriateness of the independence risk
model? Is there research that the Board should be made aware
of that would be helpful in expanding the model or otherwise
making it more useful for independence decision makers? If so,
please describe that research.
2.4

We support ISB’s view (expressed in paragraph 52) that it is
appropriate to think in terms of independence risk rather than in
terms of the existence or non-existence of independence.
However, we are concerned by the statement at paragraph 49
that ‘An auditor is independent when independence risk is at an
acceptably low level, as determined by a particular
independence decision maker’. This raises the prospect of
decision makers disagreeing as to whether an auditor is
independent only because they have differing viewpoints.

2.5

The proposed IFAC Code of Ethics focuses on the judgement of a
reporting accountant and utilises terminology to draw attention
to certain levels of independence risk:
• Risks are clearly insignificant
• The effect of risks and safeguards together fall below a level
which would make acceptance or continuation of an
engagement appropriate (ie. The risk to independence is at
an acceptable level)
and
• There are insufficient safeguards to reduce risks below the
level which would allow acceptance or continuation of an
engagement such that refusal is necessary (refusal is seen as
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a safeguard).

2.6

We have not carried out or commissioned research which would
be helpful in expanding the model or otherwise making it more
useful for independence decision makers.

The Association of Chartered Certified Accountants
29 Lincoln’s Inn Fields London WC2A 3EE United Kingdom
tel: +44 (0)20 7396 7000 fax: +44 (0)20 7396 7070
www.accaglobal.com
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J. M. Tull School o f Accounting
College o f Business Administration
The University o f Georgia
Athens, Georgia 30602

Von Allmen School o f Accountancy
Gatton College o f Business and Economics
The University o f Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky 40506-0034

February 14, 2001
Reference: ED 00-2
Independence Standards Board
6th Floor, 1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Gentlemen:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on Exposure Draft 00-2, “A Conceptual
Framework for Auditor Independence. We believe the framework offers a useful beginning
structure for understanding independence risk. However, many of the concepts in the
framework are ill defined. More importantly, there is little linkage between threats and
safeguards, and no attempt to understand exactly how they affect auditors’ independence. We
believe The Independence Standards Board (ISB) should develop a broader model that will
demonstrate how these factors interrelate and how they affect auditors.
The ISB’s list of threats and safeguards related to independence risk is illustrated in
Figure One. The Exposure Draft does not explain in any detail how the factors listed
affect auditors to increase or decrease independence risk. As the Conceptual
Framework is to be used:
a.

b.

c.

d.

to help the Independence Standards Board (ISB or Board) meet its
responsibilities to set sound and consistent standards by providing
direction and structure for resolving independence issues;
to assist other independence decision makers1 in resolving questions
about independence in the absence o f ISB standards and other
independence rules;
to help investors, other users o f financial information, and other
interested parties understand the nature, significance, and
limitations o f auditor independence; and
to focus debate and serve as a boundary for discussions about auditor
independence issues, thereby helping interested parties contribute to

1Words and phrases defined in the Glossary are set in italic type the first time they are used
in the Statement.

the development and application of, and better understand the rationale
and process underlying, ISB standards. (ISB 2000, paragraph 1),
we believe that providing a clearer understanding o f the attributes underlying the threats and
safeguards and causally linking them to independent risk is critical to the success of the
Conceptual Framework. The Conceptual Framework continues:
The significance o f a specific threat depends on many factors, including
the nature o f the activity, relationship, or other circumstance creating the
threat; the force with which pressure is exerted or felt; the importance o f
the matter that is the subject o f the activity, relationship, or other
circumstance; the position and level o f the o f responsibility o f the persons
involved; and the strength o f the integrity o f the persons involved.
Independence decision makers should evaluate these and other factors
when assessing the threats to auditor independence posed by various
activities, relationships, and other circumstances. (ISB 2000, paragraph
19)
The Exposure Draft makes a similar statement for safeguards. If financial statement users and
corporate board members are to properly evaluate auditors’ independence, they must have an
understanding of how various threats and safeguards affect that risk. This understanding also
includes an appreciation of the role o f moderating elements such as training, professional
identity, and personal ethics. Individual auditors also need this understanding in assessing
their own independence and in making audit decisions when, for example, there is no
authoritative guidance.
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Figure One
Conceptual Framework Independence Model

Personal
Qualities
e.g., integrity
Threats to
Independence
•self-interest
•self-review
•advocacy
•familiarity
•intimidation

Independence Risk

Safeguards for
Independence
•the environmenta
•the auditing firmb

Outcome
Accounting firm:
•tone at the top
•professional environment and culture
•quality assurance programs
•other policies and practices
•personnel policies

a nvironment:
E
•reputations
•peer review
•corporate governance e.g., audit committees
•standards, rules and disciplinary actions
•legal liability

Researchers have approached independence from a number o f disciplines, including
Economics (e.g. DeAngelo 1981, Simunic 1984, Antle 1984), Psychology (e.g. Bazerman, et
al 1997), and Ethics (e.g. Sweeney and Roberts 1997). However, there has been little attempt
to provide a comprehensive model linking the findings and implications from these
disciplines. In order for users and decision makers to understand and evaluate independence
risk, they must understand the underlying causes of the threats and safeguards proposed by the
conceptual framework. Some studies have integrated theories from more than one discipline,
such as economics and psychology (e.g. King 2001), organizational behavior and economics
(e.g. Farmer et. al 1987), and ethics and economics (e.g. Koford and Penno 1992). However,
no one, to our knowledge, has attempted to develop a comprehensive theoretical model from
which to understand linkages between threats and safeguards in evaluating independence risk.
The ISB’s Conceptual Framework provides a starting point for undertaking this endeavor.
A useful framework to begin integration and model development comes from Jones (1991).
As illustrated in Figure Two, Jones starts with four stages of moral decision making developed
by Rest (1986). Jones adds moral intensity, which consists o f magnitude o f consequences,
probability of effect, temporal immediacy, social consensus, proximity, and concentration of
effect. Jones also includes organizational effects such as group dynamics, organizational
authority, and socialization processes.
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Figure Two
Jones (1991) Ethical Decision Making Model
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Behavior

Organizational
Factors

Many of the concepts and factors from the Exposure Draft’s Conceptual Framework can be
mapped into this framework with little difficulty. For example, self-interest, self-review,
advocacy, and familiarity are elements o f moral intensity. Intimidation may be an
organizational factor or an element of moral intensity. Environmental factors such as
reputation, peer review, corporate governance, standards and legal liability are organizational
factors, as are firm related factors.
The elements in the Exposure Draft’s Conceptual Framework are provided on a piecemeal
basis. The Jones model illustrates how the factors can begin to be linked together. A more
thorough review of literature, obtaining descriptive data, and empirical testing o f hypotheses is
necessary for a complete model containing all-important factors. For example, Bazerman, et
al. (1997) show that economic self-interest can subconsciously bias auditors toward their
clients.
However, King’s (2001) results suggest that conscious factors like group
identification can mitigate self-interest threats. Until we understand such linkages between
conscious and subconscious threats and safeguards in a decision-making framework, it will be
difficult for independence decision makers to make proper assessments o f independence risk.
Threats can be categorized according to client type, the nature o f the activity and its
importance, the position and level of responsibility o f persons involved. Another important
part of the model will be the role of auditors’ personal qualities and individual characteristics
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as sources of bias in independence risk assessment. Finally, the model should consider how
independence decision makers weigh and combine critical factors in their independence risk
assessments and how personal qualities, such as professional identification and integrity,
modify these relationships and help to determine independence risk.
In sum, we believe the Board should develop a causal model that (1) identifies the primary
factors that influence the significance o f threats to independence and the effectiveness of
mitigating safeguards, and (2) describes how these threats and safeguards combine and
interact to determine inherent risk. This model should provide a useful template to help
independence decision makers make independence risk assessments, gain insight into their
own independence risk assessments and into the independence risk assessments of others.
Based on existing research, we believe the Board should also accumulate evidence on the
importance of personal qualities and characteristics in independence risk. The suggested
model will also provide a framework for identifying and understanding differences in inherent
risk assessments between different types of independence decision makers.

Sincerely,

Robert J. Ramsay, Ph. D., CPA

E. Michael Bamber, Ph. D.
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February 28, 2001
To:

Independence Standards Board

From: David Dufendach
Re:

Statement o f Independence Concepts
Exposure Draft ED 00-2

This memorandum will address the specific issues listed on pp. iii and iv o f the Exposure
Draft.
1.

Definition o f Auditor Independence

No comments - definition appears appropriate.
2.

Goal o f Auditor Independence

This is absolutely the right focus. This goal is also very consistent with Statement o f
Financial Accounting Concepts #1, which focuses on the needs o f third-party investors as
the primary goal o f financial reporting.
3 & 4. Concepts and Basic Principles o f Auditor Independence
Paragraph 23 presents a continuum o f independence risk (“IR”), including the terms “no
IR,” “remote IR,” and “some IR.” Paragraph 25 then states that only a “very low level”
of IR would be acceptable. To make these concepts operational, should the definitions be
more consistent? For example, should the document state that “only a remote level o f
IR” would be acceptable? Or, should paragraph 23 be expanded/modified to incorporate
a definition of “very low level” consistent with the guidance o f paragraph 25?
Regarding the discussion o f benefits and costs, I generally agree with the rationale
concerning “second-order effects” that appears in paragraph 29. However, I am also
familiar with anecdotal evidence (from the business media) that suggests that the
experience and knowledge gained from the provision o f non-audit activities is often not
communicated to auditors in ways that facilitate audit quality. For these second-order
effects to truly represent a “cost,” our profession must do a better job o f realizing and
demonstrating the benefits that inhere in the provision o f non-audit services. Is this topic
an appropriate one to address in this ED? If not ultimately addressed, the issue o f
whether or not non-audit services should be provided by audit firms will likely surface
again and again.
5.

Other Issues

In general, this ED provides little specific guidance regarding non-audit services. Should
the topic be addressed more explicitly?

Commentary
Exposure Draft
Statement of Independence Concepts
A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence

This commentary is in response to the exposure draft (above referenced) and the
supporting article in the Journal o f Accountancy (February 2001). It follows the order o f
the “Questions for Respondents” in the exposure draft which are not necessarily in order
of importance to this author.
1.) Definition o f Auditor Independence
The ‘publications’ stress the auditors and audit teams and the pressures or factors that
compromise ... “an ability to make unbiased decisions.” Further, we now have
“independence decision makers,” presumably practice units (firms or parts o f firms)
which will have the final responsibility for determining violations o f or threats to
independence.
What has happened to the “appearance o f independence.” In my forty-five years o f
practice, this was the beacon—the guiding light o f independence concepts— now
disappeared without even a good-bye. It used to be a given, that CPAs would not accept
engagements or assignments where they could not function with objectivity, integrity,
and independence. Rather, as a profession, we imposed the additional burden on
ourselves o f appearance— how would the business community and the public see the
matter. We were unbending in the matter o f appearance, even though our members
incurred economic cost to respect this concept. Has economics now become the beacon?
2.) Goal o f Auditor Independence
The publications suggest that the goal o f auditor independence is to “support user
reliance on the financial reporting process and to enhance capital market efficiency.”
This is a very narrow definition. What about the image o f the profession to the public?
What about the respect afforded to CPA’s in the 1001 services they provide clients
outside o f the attest function and financial statements.
Even applying the ‘narrow’ definition to our goal raises serious questions. Does the use
o f “independence decision makers” support reliance and enhance efficiency? Can the fox
be trusted to design the chicken coop? ... and even if we believe it can be trusted, how
does it look? Worse, how does it look if a chicken(s) is (are) missing?
3. & 4.) Concepts and Basic Principles o f Auditor Independence
Everyone who has some years in public practices is familiar with “independence risk.” It
is as natural to the public accountant’s work as transpositions. Further, every firm has
imposed safeguards— and these safeguards stem from and revolve around Rule 101 o f the
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Commentary
Exposure Draft
Statement o f Independence Concepts
A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence

Code o f Professional Conduct. Now it appears we are discarding Rule 101 and
suggesting that independence decision makers can assess an “acceptable level” o f
independence risk and modify it by steps taken as they see fit.
At the least, it seems the profession should mandate that such decisions put the burden on
the independence decision makers to support an avoidance o f Rule 101 (or its ISB
successor) just as we require an auditor who makes a decision in conflict with published
standards to support his variation or be found in violation o f Rule 202.
Also, we are saying a basic principle o f independence is a cost benefit rule. Thus,
between an acceptable level o f independence risk and the evaluation o f cost vs. benefit o f
independence, we have achieved the concept o f “just a little bit pregnant” as a measure
for independence compliance.
Finally, these matters are summarized in a conceptual framework. Conspicuous by its
absence is the indication that the ISB will provide a skeleton, a framework, and some
consistency to the independence concept between and among the practice units. Thus,
each individual or organization is free to assess, evaluate, and modify (rationalize)
independence risks for the practice unit in free form. (Yes, Virginia, the public
accounting profession really cares about independence.)
5.) Other Issues
The timing o f this change so soon after the news was full o f ‘Big 5 ’ violations o f
independence rules should be considered. Instead o f disciplining the firms and their
member violators, we give a perception o f changing the rules so the acts in questions are
no longer violations. This is too much too fast.
The relaxation o f ownership rules for large firms with ‘publicly traded’ clients is asking
for trouble. Imagine a client that has a terrific year with a corresponding stock value
increase. Now the news is that a number o f (non-engagement team) firm members
purchased stock during the year. Could that be insider information? Can you stop a
firm’s jungle drums/grapevine? How will the press or SEC handle this and what happens
to the rest o f the profession?
The relaxation or elimination o f family relationship rule(s) has great appeal. My heart
goes out to the husband and wife example in the Journal o f Accountancy article.
However, I suspect that the frequency o f occurrence o f this example is next to nil.
Imagine what will happen if there is a client bankruptcy or alleged financial impropriety.
It is a given that H&W are innocent, but does that deter the p lain tiffs attorney or press?
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6.) Conclusion

Rule 101 has been in effect for some fifty years. It has helped to polish the professions
reputation amongst the business and financial communities and helped to earn one o f the
“most respected professions” from the public at large.
Suddenly, we have the papers full o f ‘Big 5’ violations and a new ISB which must feel
pressured to “do something”. Can it be right to cancel Rule 101 (which is admittedly
burdensome) and transfer the ethics administration to the firms/practice units by creation
o f the concept o f “independence decision makers” as the arbiters for independence
questions? I don’t think so. At the least, such a change should come in small steps or
increments. Let us see how the change works by assigning one o f the Sections o f 101 to
the firms and monitoring the results. Then, if satisfied, we can incrementally add to the
firms responsibilities. If it doesn’t, we can go back to what brung us.

Paul Goldberg
Member Ethics Committee
Illinois CPA Society
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Memorandum

TH E C H U R C H OF

JESUS CHRIST
February 28, 2001
Art Siegel
Dennis Spackman
Subject: Response to ED 00-2
Date:

O F LATTER-DAY SAINTS

To:
From:

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the Exposure Draft, ED 00-2, Statement o f Independence
Concepts; A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence.
I would like to express my appreciation for the excellent support you and your staff provided the
development of this exposure draft, and to professors Jaenicke, Glazer and Clarkson for their
exceptional support as well.
I also appreciate the extended period for comments. It has given me time to focus on both the content
and relationships of the various elements of the framework.
Please find attached, my response to the questions asked in the ED and other observations I made
during my reading of it. I hope you find them helpful.

Best regards always,

Dennis
Dennis Paul Spackman
50 East North Temple, 15th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84150-3643
Phone:
Fax:
E-mail:
or

801-240-1280
801-240-1121
SpackmanDP@ldschurch.org
DPSpackman@worldnet.att.net

Statement of Independence Concepts:

A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence
Response to ED 00-2
Dennis Paul Spackman, CPA

February 28, 2001

My comments concerning the Exposure Draft, A conceptual Frameworkfo r Auditor Independence follow:
Question on Definition o f Auditor Independence: Is the definition appropriate? I f not, what changes
would you suggest, and why?
After careful consideration I find the definition to be effective. The discussion around the definition is very
good. It places the definition in a relevant context that makes it operational.
There is however, one factor missing from the discussion and that is the importance of the role of
management, boards and directors and audit committees. I believe the ED could give more attention to the
responsibilities of management, boards of directors and audit committees for the development of sound
financial information and maintenance of auditor/audit firm independence. The conceptual framework would
benefit for instance, from the inclusion of some of the relevant thinking and beneficial efforts of the Blue
Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees and, the ISB’s efforts on
these same matters.
I also suggest the following change be made in paragraph #7, item “b”: “ . . . factors - defined in this
Statement as safeguards, restrictions and prohibitions to auditor independence;” I make this suggestion
because I believe the ED gives to much focus to the word “safeguards”. I suggest a broader perspective be
adopted such as “Safeguards, Restrictions and Prohibitions.” This broader perspective recognizes the fact
that standard setters have and will continue to set restrictions and prohibitions for particular activities,
relationships and circumstances, not just “safeguards.” Tucking restrictions and prohibitions under the broad
umbrella of “safeguards” may be conceptually correct but it may also be a strategic error.
Question on Goal o f Auditor Independence: Is the goal appropriate? I f not, what changes would you
suggest, and why?
I like the simplicity and clarity of the definition but it may have a weakness. The definition doesn’t explain
how or why auditor independence and the users’ perceptions of the auditor’s independence establish user
reliance. Missing also are the concepts of credibility and confidence. This problem could be overcome if the
goal statement was broadened to tie more effectively to the two key elements of the goal of independence,
enhancing capital market efficiency and, user reliance and confidence on the financial reporting process. I
believe the goal would be strengthened with this modification. The narrative discussion following the goal
covers these matters. Couldn’t these concepts be incorporated into the wording of the goal itself?
Question on Concepts and Basic Principles o f Auditor Independence: Are the concepts and basic
principles appropriate and sufficiently operational? I f not, what changes would you suggest, and why?
I am troubled with the Concepts and Principles paragraphs of the ED. After some consideration I’ve
concluded the ED probably doesn’t have solid principles statements, principles that are statements of basic
truths or standards. Instead, it presents a set of four concepts that are pretty solid and would probably better
serve as principles and, four principles whose nature and application is instead more advisory.
1

After some consideration, I believe there are perhaps only three basic principles:
Principle #1; Threats to auditor independence, independence risk: (Paragraphs #18, and #10 through #12)
An auditor’s ability to make unbiased decisions can be compromised if threats to the auditor’s independence
are not mitigated.
Threats to auditor independence that may compromise, or may reasonably be expected to compromise, an
auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions include:
•
•
•
•
•

Self interest threats
Self-review threats
Advocacy threats
Familiarity (or trust) threats
Intimidation threats

(I suggest the four guiding principles of the SEC’s revised independence requirements: 1) has a mutual or
conflicting interest with the audit client, 2) audits his or her own firm’s work, 3) functions as management or
an employee of the audit client, and 4) acts as an advocate for the audit client, be incorporated into and made
part of this principle.)
Principle #2: Significance of threats to auditor independence: (Paragraph #19)
The significance of a threat to auditor independence is the extent to which the threat increases independence
risk. Significance depends on many factors including the nature of the activity, relationship, or other
circumstance creating the threat including:
•
•
•
•

Force of pressure exerted
Importance of the matter relative to - activity, relationship or circumstance
Position and level of responsibility of person involved
Strength and integrity of person involved

Principle #3: Safeguards, Restrictions and Prohibitions: (Paragraph #13)
Safeguards, restrictions and prohibitions may be used to mitigate or eliminate threats to auditor independence.
Concepts/Guidance - Safeguards, Restrictions and Prohibitions: (Paragraphs #14a through #17 and #20)
The paragraphs of the ED cited discusses various means of mediating risks to auditor independence. They
give important guidance, but I don’t believe they operate at the same level, as do principles.
I suggest the subject matter of these paragraphs be presented in the following order:
Reference order and subject stem:
# 15
Another way of describing safeguards is by their nature:
#16
A third way in which safeguards can be described . . . .
#20
The effectiveness of a safeguard to auditor independence is . . . .
#14/a
Safeguards exist in the environment. . .
2

#14b
#17

Safeguards that exist within auditing firms . . . .
Safeguards may work either singly or in combination . . . .

The material discussed in the above referenced paragraphs is important and does warrant separate treatment.
However, as noted previously, I believe the EDs focus on the word “safeguards” is a mistake. A broader
context should be adopted. One that gives recognition to the fact that standard setters have and will continue
to set restrictions and prohibitions for particular activities, relationships and circumstances.
I would also like to see more attention given to the responsibilities of management, boards of directors and
audit committees for developing sound financial information and the independence of the auditor/audit firm
than is currently given in paragraph 14a.
Relevant information contained in paragraphs #22 - #32 should be incorporated into this section of the ED.
What are your views on the appropriateness o f the independence risk model? Is there research that the
Board should be made aware o f that would be helpful in expanding the model or otherwise making it more
usefulfor independent decision makers? I f so, please describe that research.
I believe the risk model is sound and the profession’s experience with it has substantiated its viability.
Question on Other Issues: Are there other issues in connection with the proposed conceptual framework that
the Board should consider? I f so, what are those issues, and how would you advise the Board to resolve
them?
I do not have any other issues.

I hope you find these comments helpful. Should you have any questions or want to discuss them with me,
please feel free to call.

Best regards always,

Dennis
Dennis Paul Spackman
50 East North Temple, 15th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84150-3643
Phone:
Fax:
E-mail:
or

801-240-1280
801-240-1121
SpackmanDP@ldschurch.org
DPSpackman@worldnet.att.net
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February 28, 2001

Mr. Arthur Siegel
Executive Director
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue o f the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775

Dear Art:
I have read the Exposure Draft of ED 00-2 entitled Statement o f Independence Concepts
A Conceptual Framework fo r Auditor Independence. I believe that the ISB (Board) has
developed a reasonably complete list o f threats to auditor independence, and I support the
safeguards approach to addressing identified threats.
I am responding as an individual, and my comments do not necessarily represent the
views o f the Auditing Standards Committee o f the American Accounting Association’s
Auditing Section.
I hope all is well with you.
Best regards,

Joseph V. Carcello
Stokely Scholar and Associate Professor

COMMENTS ON “STATEMENT OF INDEPENDENCE CONCEPTS A
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR AUDITOR INDEPENDENCE”
(EXPOSURE DRAFT NO. ED 00-2)
Comments of Joseph V. Carcello, Ph.D., CPA, CMA, CIA
Stokely Scholar and Associate Professor
University of Tennessee
I believe that the ISB (Board) has developed a reasonably complete list o f threats to
auditor independence, and I support the safeguards approach to addressing identified
threats.
Major Concerns
Paragraph .12. ED 00-2 identifies five threats to auditor independence - self-interest
threats, self-review threats, advocacy threats, familiarity (or trust) threats, and
intimidation threats. I believe that some o f these threats are exacerbated by pressures
imposed by the firm. For example, the auditor may face: (1) penalties for losing a client,
(2) demands to bring in new business, (3) cost o f technical consultations being charged to
the job thus hurting realization rates, etc. I suggest that the Board explicitly recognize
these firm pressures, and recognize the pernicious effects that such firm pressures can
have when they interact with the five threats to auditor independence identified in the
document. This issue is particularly problematic since ED 00-2 identifies the firm as a
primary party responsible for implementing safeguards to address threats to auditor
independence. The Board should not lose sight o f the fact that, in some cases, the firm
and/or its representatives can be a non-trivial part o f the problem.
Paragraph .12, e. In discussing intimidation threats, I encourage the Board to consider
adding a statement that an auditor is not independent if the client fails to comply with the
new audit committee rule whereby the auditor is to view the board o f directors and the
audit committee as the client. If client management cannot terminate the auditor without
the audit committee’s consent, management’s ability to intimidate the auditor has been
reduced (assuming a properly functioning audit committee). Explicitly stating that the
auditor is not independent if the client fails to act in accordance with this new audit
committee rule may give these new rules additional “teeth.”
Paragraph .13. ED 00-2 states that safeguards include prohibitions, restrictions,
disclosures (my emphasis), policies, procedures, etc. I encourage the Board to consider
working with the SEC to require the auditor to report on Form 8-K any direct or implied
threats from management.
Paragraph .17, a. In discussing the mitigation o f self-interest threats, ED 00-2 suggests
restrictions on the percentage o f total firm fees earned from one auditee. I support this
suggestion. However, audit decisions are made at the local office level, and by
engagement personnel (partners). An additional safeguard would be to limit fees derived

from any one client at the level o f the local office and at the level o f the individual
partner.
Paragraph .24. ED 00-2 states that, “Independence decision makers should determine
whether the level o f independence risk is at an acceptable position on the independence
risk continuum.” I disagree. A quasi-regulatory agency (i.e., the ISB) charged with
protecting the public interest should make this decision. “High independence risk”
should never be acceptable, and “remote independence risk” should be required for those
engagements representing high risk to the public (e.g., large company size, widely
dispersed ownership, weak governance characteristics, rapid company growth, high PE
ratios, volatile industry, financial distress, etc.).
I have another concern with paragraph .24. I am unsure as to whether certain
independence decision makers (e.g., the ISB, audit committees, boards o f directors,
regulators) will have enough information to assess the substance, and not just the form, o f
safeguards that exist within auditing firms.
Paragraph .25. In this paragraph, ED 00-2 states that “ ... independence decision makers
should consider only a very low level o f independence risk to be acceptable.” The
continuum of independence risk presented on p. 9 does not contain a “very low level” o f
independence risk. Is a “very low level” between “no independence risk” and “remote
independence risk” or between “remote independence risk” and “some independence
risk.” In addition, it seems that paragraphs .24 and .25 are not entirely consistent. Are
independence decision makers to decide on the acceptable level o f independence risk or
is it to be specified by the ISB?
Paragraph .27. ED 00-2 states that, “Independence decision makers should ensure that
the benefits resulting from reducing independence risk by imposing additional safeguards
exceed the costs o f those safeguards.” The benefits from reducing independence risk
accrue to both current and potential investors and creditors and to society as a whole.
The costs are borne by the client and the audit firm. I do not believe that the costs and
benefits should be weighted equally (i.e., the benefits should be weighted more heavily).
Paragraph .27, c. ED 00-2 discusses a benefit to senior management o f reduced
independence risk as being more reliable financial information. I encourage the Board to
recall that senior management is typically involved when an entity experiences severe
financial reporting problems.
Minor Concerns
Paragraph 4. ED 00-2 states, “ ... an auditor must be free only from those factors that are
so significant that they rise to a level where they compromise ...”. You might consider
explicitly stating that factors can achieve the necessary level o f significance such that
independence might be compromised either alone (one very large threat to independence)
or in combination (a series o f smaller threats to independence that, when considered
together, represent a large threat).

Paragraph .22. A key concept throughout all o f ED 00-2 is that o f “independence
decision makers.” Although this term is defined in the glossary (p. 13), I think its
definition should appear early in the text because the entire Exposure Draft is dependent
on the acceptance o f this concept.
Paragraph .54. ED 00-2 states that “ ... in some cases, the costs o f attempting to get
closer to the “no independence risk” endpoint on the continuum may exceed the benefits
o f reducing independence risk. I encourage the Board to provide examples o f such cases
in the document.
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26 February 2001

Mr. Arthur Siegel, Executive Director
Independence Standard Board
1211 Avenue of Americas
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Mr. Siegel
On the attached sheet I have some comments re the November 2000 ED: Statement of Independence
Concepts.
To present "concepts" in a lucid manner is not a simple task. At the same time, as I think about
"independence" as a requirement for a public accountant, a clearer, more readily understandable
explanation should be possible than is presented in this Exposure Draft.
I send my best wishes to you and your colleagues as you conclude your conceptual framework project.
Sincerely

Mary Ellen Oliverio
Department of Accounting
Attached: Some comments
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W E S T C H E S T E R

EXPOSURE DRAFT
Statement of Independence Concepts
A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence November 2000
COMMENTS:
(I must begin by noting a bias: Possibly, nothing captured my attention when I studied auditing more than
the notion that an auditor was independent. When I began teaching auditing, the textbooks I read
discussed independence as “the foundation" of the auditor's qualifications. I continue to believe that the
significance of an auditor's contribution is related to an unrelenting respect for independence and
persistent adherence to objectivity which is the operational outcome of that respect.)
Implied conceptualization is troublesome. The Statement seems to be implying that independence is
"only one source. .. of quality audits." (page 2) Further on there is a discussion of "considering benefits
and costs" in relation to independence risk. It appears that decision makers can determine the risk they
wish to accept, (pages 9-10) How does "low level of independence risk" become reconciled with
"consider benefits and costs." It appears that the concept of independence is just one of many factors
and there is opportunity to substitute other factors that are perceived to be sufficient for quality audits.
Auditor independence is freedom from those pressures.. . .(page 2) It is not clear how
"independence is freedom. . ." Is not independence related to being able to separate one's decision
making from pressures.
"Freedom" is a somewhat unrealistic state... the client is paying the auditor
and is interested in presenting the company in the most favorable position... and that client may threaten
the auditor that “we will find another auditor who better understands u s.. " . . . Paragraph 4 is a very
fuzzy, ambiguous series of sentences.
Threats to auditor independence, (page 4, 6) I wonder why there is not a more realistic identification
of firm policies (including the valued position of the rainmaker), such as the basis for retention, and
promotion that could impact auditor independence. There is, for example, a listing of "maintaining the
tone at the top., .but should there be something more concrete than "stresses the expectation. . . " (I
teach auditing at the graduate level; many of our students accept positions with the Big-5 firms. One of
the most disappointing experiences some former students explain to me is illustrated by this comment:
"Yes, we get memos that we must adhere to policies--every audit is to be high quality; however, that
memo is for the record; it is not the reality.. . . " )
Why not detail costs as benefits are enumerated? (page 10) Paragraph 29, it seems to me, should
enumerate the costs... this is another fuzzy paragraph.
Where on the continuum of auditor independence risk must an audit firm be before the auditors
can issue an opinion that is not a disclaimer? The current guidance (AU504.08-.09), as you know,
requires a disclaimer if auditors are not independent. Given the ED, it would appear that auditors would
make no claim about being independent because they may have determined that the really important
factors do not include independence. Will the Board provide the alternative ways that auditors will report
how they assessed the level of independence that was sufficient for their purposes?
Has the Board considered deregulating independence? Why not let companies determine if they want an
audit by an outside auditor. A publicly-owned company could be free to present its financial statements
with a report from its own CFO which clearly establishes the fact that no outside auditor was engaged.
Mary Ellen Oliverio
Professor of Accounting
Pace University
New York, NY 10038
212 346 1819 moliverio@pace.edu
2/26/01
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Independence Standards Board
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
Attn: ED 00-2

Re Statement of Independence Concepts,
A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence,
Exposure Draft 00-2
Dear Board Members:
Although we support the threats-and-safeguards structure of the Exposure Draft (ED), we
believe that flaws would render the statement harmful to independence decision-making,
and we oppose its adoption in the present form. The defects begin with the definition of
auditor independence and permeate the document. The ED represents an untenable bal
ance between the old, insupportable appearances approach to independence and an ap
proach based on the risk of compromised objectivity. The appearances approach is in the
definition of independence, implied by the goal of auditor independence, and in the
fourth principle (paragraph 30). For these reasons, lack of coordination among the ideas,
and misleading and ill-chosen language, the ED falls well short of the intellectually rig
orous conceptual framework we need. In our comments below, we recommend improve
ments that would make the document useful for its intended purposes.

The Definition’s Tw o C riteria
The ED ’s definition of auditor independence should be more explicitly linked to the con
cept of independence risk. It is flawed by absolutism, contains internal tensions, and is
inconsistent with some of the other concepts. This greatly affects the usefulness of the
ED, since the definition affects the meaning of other concepts and principles that use the
word “independence,” and if the ED is adopted in its current form, the flaws would have
a widespread effect on communications about independence. Here is the E D ’s definition:

Auditor independence is freedom from those pressures and other factors that compromise, or
can reasonably be expected to compromise, an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit deci
sions. (paragraph 4)

KPMG LLP. KPMG LLP a U.S. limited liability partnership, is
a member of KPMG International, a Swiss association.
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The relationship between the two characteristics connected by the “or” is not apparent or
explained, though the characteristics function as criteria indicating whether a party is or is
not independent. Why should a person who cannot reasonably be expected to have com
promised ability to make unbiased audit decisions (the second criterion) not be consid
ered independent under the first criterion, which is implied by having both criteria? Can a
person who does not satisfy the second criterion be considered independent under the
first? The “or” functions as “and,” but no rationale for a definition with two different cri
teria is given. If two criteria are not necessary, there should be only one. Independence
concepts should be simple and spare whenever possible.

The First Criterion Is Absolute
The first criterion, “freedom from those pressures and other factors that com prom ise...,”
is absolute. No person could be free from all the factors that compromise an auditor’s
ability to make unbiased audit decisions. The criterion includes immaterially compro
mised “ability to make unbiased audit decisions” and immaterial audit decisions. Audit
decisions vary from those that influence the opinion to those that do not.
The criterion is absolute in another way. No one can determine prior to or during an audit
whether the practitioner is free from all influences that compromise the ability to make
unbiased audit decisions. There is no way to arrive at the conclusion that the criterion has
been met.
Paragraph 41 of the Basis for Conclusions argues that the definition is not absolute.
However, paragraph 41’s argument is unconvincing. W hether or not an influence rises to
the level of compromising audit decisions is irrelevant to whether it functions as an abso
lute criterion. All influences that rise to such a level are defined as impairing independ
ence. The criterion is severe enough never to be satisfied. Paragraph 40 points out that
under the definition “auditors can be affected by pressures and other factors that do not
bias audit decisions,” but such events are not of interest. W hether or not influences on
auditors’ decisions on recreation or family matters are influenced by some factor does not
make the population of interest, that is, the population of influences on audit decisions,
any less absolutely complete.
Paragraph 41 says that the definition “describes a state that an auditor can attain, namely,
the ability to make unbiased audit decisions.” However, the sentence focuses on the
wrong state. The issue that the definition raises is whether the auditor is free of all influ
ences that bias audit decisions, not whether the auditor can make unbiased audit deci
sions. In any case, no one can determine either state in advance of an audit with a suffi
ciency to satisfy the absolute nature of the definition.
In contrast, independence decision makers can determine whether the risk of impaired
objectivity is unacceptable. As paragraph 6 of the ED says, “To be independent, an audi

tor must be able...to overcome pressures and other factors that would prevent unbiased
audit decisions.” Overcoming pressures and other factors is not being free of them. They
are always present in some manner and in some degree. The audit fee is frequently cited
to illustrate this point.
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The Definition’s The Second Criterion
Eliminating the definition’s absolute element would leave: “Freedom from those pres
sures and other factors that can reasonably be expected to compromise an auditor’s abil
ity to make unbiased audit decisions.” However, apart from its insupportable interpreta
tion as a criterion for appearance of independence,1 the definition using the reasonableexpectation criterion would not be desirable for this reason: It would be insufficiently
linked to the idea of independence risk. (The relationship between the first criterion in the
ED ’s definition and independence risk is treated below under a separate heading.)
The ED ’s first two principles reflect an independence-risk approach. The definition of
independence should be linked to the independence-risk approach and the defined con
cept of independence risk. In addition and more importantly, the public interest is best
served by a realistic definition of independence, and the only realistic definition of inde
pendence is based on an acceptable level of independence risk. Rulemakers’ decisions
about independence have always been about independence risk and always will be. No
standard setter or regulator has attempted to ban every potential influence on auditor ob
jectivity, including the audit fee, and no party has, to our knowledge, argued that it is
necessary. Despite rhetoric about appearance of independence, even language about ap
pearances in rules and requirements, no standard setter or regulator has attempted to ban
practices because of appearances.
The test is not whether the rulemakers say they are using such a criterion, but how they
go about making the rules. They have not, to our knowledge, sought defensible evidence
of appearances, evaluated what that evidence meant, applied the findings, and regularly
updated the rules for new findings on appearances or confirmed that the rules in place
reflected current findings on appearances. Appearances change, and the stringency of
rules would have to be altered as such changes occurred. Evidence that this has never
been done lies in the plain fact that appearance of independence has never been used to
consider relaxing independence requirements, much less actually relaxing them, even
though evidence has been available that auditors’ independence and work are well
thought of by constituents. The ISB’s Earnscliffe research is an example.
The idea of appearance of independence should not be available for arbitrary use in justi
fying prohibitions that cannot be justified as necessary to reduce independence risk to an
acceptable level. Standard setters should not be encouraged to pretend they are applying
the appearances criterion when they are merely paying it lip service. No conceptual
framework with an appearances criterion can be considered forthright and thorough if it
fails to acknowledge that the criterion has been used only by name in the past and has
never been honored by the hard, and impracticable, work of ongoing research and main
tenance. If fully pursued, an appearances criterion would probably never meet a costbenefit test.

See paragraph 2 of the Summary and paragraphs 42-45 of the Basis for Conclusions.
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The notion that the “reasonable expectation” is the expectation of “well-informed inves
tors and other users of financial information” (paragraph 4) is an appearance-of-independence concept. Note that it goes beyond the well-informed to include those not-wellinformed (“and other users of financial information”). We have explained before why
such a criterion is arbitrary, conceptually unsound, and inconsistent with evidence that
investors and other stakeholders take no interest in independence rulemaking, do not
know independence rules, and are unaware of the specifics of independence situations.
Our arguments are reproduced in the appendix to this letter.
In another inconsistency, the ED ’s own statements show how ill-advised is the appear
ances approach to “reasonable expectation.” Paragraph 38 says,
[T]he Board recognizes that investors, users, and other interested parties ordinarily cannot ob
tain information about pressures and other factors that may affect a specific auditor’s ability
in a specific audit engagement to make unbiased audit decisions. They rely on independence
decision makers to identify and analyze various activities, relationships, and other circum
stances that are sources of pressures and other factors that can reasonably be expected to lead
to biased audit decisions, and to adopt appropriate safeguards, if necessary, to reduce inde
pendence risk to an acceptably low level.
This statement suggests it is wrong and unworkable to treat “reasonable expectation” as
the expectation of “well-informed investors and other users of financial information.”

The Definition: Incom patibility w ith Independence Risk
The absolute criterion of independence (“freedom from those pressures and other factors
that com promise...an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions”) is inconsistent
with the concept of independence risk. Independence risk is the risk remaining, after bal
ancing threats and safeguards, that the auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions
will be compromised. The absolute criterion means there is no such risk (total freedom
from compromising factors) or the auditor is not independent. In other words, under the
absolute criterion, and therefore the definition, for practical purposes, independence risk
is never operational. However, as paragraph 25 says, “Given certain factors in the envi
ronment in which audits take place...independence risk cannot be completely eliminated
and, therefore, independence decision makers always accept some risk that auditors’ ob
jectivity will be compromised.” The statement is inconsistent with the definition’s abso
lute criterion of independence.

The Definition: O bjectivity and Independence
The absolute first criterion in the ED ’s definition may derive from the desire to assert that
independence is more than just following rules (as is argued in ED paragraph 6) and to
preclude anyone from holding to such an assumption. If so, the exercise is tilting wind
mills. No one is going to be prevented from believing that following the rules yields a
claim to independence. Even rulemakers must believe that following the rules they set
yields a claim to independence. Otherwise they should turn in their credentials as protec
tors of users of financial statements. Are the ISB and its staff to hold in public that the
standards they issue are not sufficient to ensure auditor independence?
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More importantly, those who are trying to come to grips with the conditions that make for
independence should not be confused into thinking that objectivity is identical to inde
pendence. The absolute criterion for independence effectively creates such an equiva
lency. It makes independence dependent on freedom from “pressures and other factors
that com prom ise...an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions.” The auditor so
absolutely free from undermining factors is automatically, by definition, 100 percent ob
jective. There would be no need for a definition of “independence” if all it meant in the
end was objectivity in making audit decisions. Objectivity is a common, widely under
stood term. The pretense that a synonym, “independence,” is a different quality is confus
ing.
Evidence that the ISB staff and project leaders realized they had built into the definition
an equivalency between independence and objectivity is in a recent article they published
in the Journal o f Accountancy. It states: “The proposed definition compels the auditor to
make a personal assessment of his or her objectivity—to determine if pressures and other
factors compromise the ability to make unbiased audit decisions.”2 As already noted,
paragraph 41 of the ED says that the definition “describes a state that an auditor can at
tain, namely, the ability to make unbiased [i.e., objective] audit decisions.”

The Definition: T hreats and Safeguards
The definition of independence is not coordinated with the concepts of threats and safe
guards. This flaw also supports our argument that a more explicit link is needed between
the definition of independence and the concept of independence risk.
Safeguards “mitigate or eliminate threats to auditor independence,” which means, accord
ing to the definition of threats, safeguards mitigate or eliminate “sources of potential bias
that may com prom ise...an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions.” Thus by
definition safeguards have no effect on pressures and other factors that in fact compro
mise an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions. They therefore have no effect
on the absolute criterion in the ED ’s definition (“freedom from those pressures and other
factors that com prom ise...an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions”). Such
pressures by definition create bias. It is arguable that review procedures can mitigate
compromised objectivity. A concurring partner’s review can right a biased audit decision.
Unfortunately, that does not solve the problem. Safeguards are defined as mitigating
threats, not “pressures and other factors that com prom ise...an auditor’s ability to make
unbiased audit decisions.” That is, safeguards, again, are defined as mitigating “sources
of potential bias.” Thus review procedures function as safeguards only to the degree that
they prevent biased audit decisions, not to the degree that they rectify such decisions. In
these ways, the definition of independence does not coordinate with the definitions of
threats and safeguards.

2 Susan McGrath, Arthur Siegel, Thomas W. Dunfee, Alan S. Glazer, and Henry R. Jaenicke, “A Frame
work for Auditor Independence,” Journal o f Accountancy, January 2001, p. 40.
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Our Recom m ended Definition
Here is the way the definition, with some editorial pruning, might look explicitly linked
to independence risk:
Auditor independence is freedom from any factors that create an unacceptable risk of biased
audit decisions.
This definition could be made more explicit. It does not say that it is limited to material
matters. However, the notions of material influences on objectivity and material or sig
nificant audit decisions are lodged in the qualifier “unacceptable.” We recommend a ver
sion of this definition.
The fat should be trimmed from any conceptual-framework definition, and the ED ’s ver
sion has fat. “Any factors” is equivalent to “pressures and other factors,” though we
would prefer a less abstract term (e.g., “conditions” or “influences”). One of the aims of a
conceptual framework is to make discourse on independence more efficient and fruitful.
That cause is not served by using “pressures and other factors” every time a single word
would convey the same message.
The independence-risk approach to defining independence would in a different way serve
the purpose evoked in paragraph 6 of the ED, which as we have seen, attempts to pre
clude those who follow the independence rules from claiming to be “independent,” as the
ED defines it. Under the independence-risk approach, no one would have an unchal
lengeable claim that following the rules means being objective, because independence
would not be equivalent to objectivity. Moreover, no one can know the level of inde
pendence risk in any circumstance. It must be estimated by all independence decision
makers. That would not prevent people and rulemakers from legitimately claiming the
rules indeed produce independence, but everyone who followed these matters would
know that an acceptable level of independence risk is a level targeted by the standard set
ters making the claim, not something absolute, universal, and incapable of being adjusted.
And everyone would know that independence was not the same as objectivity. A concep
tual framework that does public service should not conclude its passage defining inde
pendence with the words: “Compliance with the rules is a necessary, but not a sufficient,
condition for independence.” It makes the ED ’s talk of more credible financial statements
through independence empty and ironic. Compliance with the rules should be a sufficient
condition for independence, but not a sufficient condition for being objective.
The text elaborating the E D ’s definition illustrates that a definition based on an “unac
ceptable risk of biased audit decisions” is superior to one based on the criterion “can rea
sonably be expected to compromise an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit deci
sions.” Sentence three of paragraph 5 says that rules prohibiting activities and relation
ships apply to all auditors because “it is reasonable to expect audit decisions to be biased
in those circumstances.” However, this statement follows another recognizing that some
auditors’ objectivity would not be impaired by the activities and relationships, and it is
obvious that auditors differ in their ability to withstand influences that could affect objec
tivity. Thus it is not reasonable to expect that audit decisions would “be biased in those
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circumstances.” In fact, it is reasonable to believe that because auditors’ levels of imper
viousness to threats to objectivity can never be known, rules prohibiting activities and
relationships mean the risk of impaired objectivity was considered unacceptable.3

Redundant Definition of Independence Risk
Here is the way the definition of independence risk from paragraph 18 would look with
the term “auditor independence” replaced by its definition from paragraph 4. The re
placement is in square brackets:
Independence risk is the risk that threats to [freedom from those pressures and other factors
that compromise, or can reasonably be expected to compromise, an auditor’s ability to make
unbiased audit decisions], to the extent that they are not mitigated by safeguards, compro
mise, or can reasonably be expected to compromise an auditor’s ability to make unbiased au
dit decisions”
Redundancy is immediately apparent. All that would be necessary to convey the intended
meaning is “Independence risk is the risk that threats to auditor independence are not
mitigated by safeguards.”

Goal of A uditor Independence
Through the ambiguous word “support,” the goal allows that the credibility of the finan
cial reporting process is an end of auditor independence separate from the goal of reliable
financial reporting. This interpretation would contribute to the appearances approach to
independence and is inconsistent with what auditors do and the public interest in what
auditors do. Auditors undertake no activities designed to influence the credibility of the
financial reporting process. Audit procedures are designed to obtain sufficient evidence to
arrive at a correct opinion on the financial statements. Auditing standards are restricted to
delineating what is required to arrive at correct opinions, and audit reports are carefully
worded to avoid any other implications. They avoid all other implications because the
evidence gathered in compliance with the standards pertains to the reliability of the fi
nancial statements, not to the desirability of owning the auditee’s stock. A clean audit re
port follows an evidence-gathering process that could have resulted in an adverse opin
ion.
“Capital market efficiency,” cited in the goal, refers primarily to the market’s efficient
impounding of information, a pricing mechanism.4 It refers to both audited and unaudited
information. It should not be a goal of auditor independence to have information im
pounded in prices regardless of whether it is reliable or not.
3 Sentence two of the same paragraph allows that rules apply generally because of the threat of bias (poten
tial source of bias), which is consistent with the risk approach and inconsistent with the third sentence that
is the subject of the paragraph above.
4 As Burton G. Malkiel points out, “Markets can be efficient even if they make errors in the valuation of
individual stocks and exhibit greater volatility than can apparently be explained by fundamentals such as
earnings and dividends.” Burton G. Malkiel, “Are Markets Efficient? Yes, Even if they Make Errors,” The
Wall Street Journal, December 28, 2000, p. A10. Barron’s Dictionary o f Business Terms defines efficient
market this way: “theory that market prices reflect the knowledge and expectations of all investors.” (Bar
ron’s Educational Series, Inc.: New York, 1987).
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Everyone knows about the risks of a “bubble economy” and “irrational exuberance.”
Confidence in financial reports can be engendered by fraudulent activities. It would be
improper for auditors to work for confidence in financial statements or the capital mar
kets by any means other than helping to ensure the reliability of financial reports. Indeed,
the threats to independence listed in paragraph 13 of the ED include “advocacy,” which is
contrasted with unbiased work on the financial statements. Advocacy, by inference,
would include working to enhance public credibility for the financial statements apart
from the work to evaluate their reliability.
The effect of high quality auditing, and therefore more reliable information, on the capital
markets is better decisions by investors and creditors, the kind of decisions more likely to
lead to economic growth and stability than decisions based on less reliable information. If
the ED ’s goal is retained, which we do not recommend, “capital market efficiency”
should be replaced by “capital market effectiveness.”
We recommend the goal of auditor independence be based on what high quality auditing
does for the economy, that is, on increasing the reliability of financial statements. Here is
the way such a goal would look:
The goal of auditor independence is to make it more likely that audits improve the reliability
of financial statements.

Independence Concepts—The T h rea t C ategories
The threat categories are insufficiently distinctive to be useful. Paragraph 12 admits that
they are not mutually exclusive or exhaustive, but the admission does not make the cate
gories useful. Quite the contrary, the admission indicates the categories cannot be relied
on to discuss threats in a consistent way. What one party identifies as a threat of a
particular category, another, by the ED ’s own admission, can rightly ascribe to a different
category. Apart from that, there is no need to have a set of threat categories in the
conceptual framework.
In any case, these threat categories are particularly clumsy. The first of them, “selfinterest,” is generic and includes the remaining four. The description of the self-interest
threat is unequivocally expansive and inclusive: “Self-interests include auditors’ emo
tional, financial, or other personal interests” (paragraph 12, item a, sentence 1). No
threats are excluded from such a category. The “self-review threat,” for example, arises
because the auditor has emotional and often financial interests in the work performed.
The “intimidation threat” works only if the auditor has a self-interest that can be threat
ened, such as the audit fee in the case of threatened firing. The advocacy threat includes
the auditor promoting an auditee’s securities, a role that creates a self-interest in sales of
the securities or arises from a desire to retain the audit fee. The familiarity threat is a per
sonal interest (a “particularly close or long-standing personal or professional relationship
with the auditee”).
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The accompanying text is evidence of the sloppy thinking that the overlapping categories
prompt and their singular inappropriateness for a conceptual framework. Self-interest
threats do not necessarily “arise from auditors acting in their own interest” (paragraph 12,
item a, sentence 1). Auditors’ self-interests include maintaining their reputation, avoiding
liability, and retaining the respect of their peers. Acting in pursuit of these self-interests
does not threaten auditors’ objectivity or independence. The implication that self-interest
threats necessarily “arise from auditors acting in their own interest” is contradicted by the
third sentence in item a: “Auditors may favor, consciously or subconsciously, those selfinterests over their interest in performing a quality audit.” This sentence admits that audi
tors have a self-interest in audit quality, and such a self-interest is entirely in keeping with
objective audit judgments.
The examples of safeguards include self-interests (“the value auditing firms and individ
ual auditors place on their reputations,” “the legal liability faced by auditors and other
participants”).5 It makes no sense to have a threat category so broad that it includes safe
guards.
The sentence defining the advocacy threat contains a false opposition: “promoting or ad
vocating for or against an auditee’s position or opinion rather than serving as unbiased
attestors of the auditees’ financial statements” (paragraph 12, item c, sentence 1). The
unbiased audit report with a clean opinion on the reliability of the financial statements
promotes the client’s position that they are reliable. An auditor who takes the same posi
tion as the client in discussions with the SEC can be totally objective.
Item d, discussing the familiarity threat, is circular. It says, “Such a threat is present if
auditors are not sufficiently skeptical of an auditee’s assertions and, as a result, too read
ily accept an auditee’s viewpoint because of their familiarity with or trust in the auditee.”
This sentence has the threat arising if the auditor has impaired objectivity (insufficient
skepticism), which means that if the auditor is not independent, the threat is present.
Apart from the circularity, the “threat” ignores that in effective audits, the auditor typi
cally has good working relationships with the clients and relies on them for some infor
mation and audit evidence.
The analysis immediately above demonstrates that threat categories a. through e. are not
useful. The set is fundamentally and consistently flawed.

Independence Concepts—Safeguards
There is no stated advantage to describing safeguards in three ways as is done in para
graphs 14-16. All the reader is told is that safeguards “can be described” in this way or
that way. Discourse on independence is not served by a conceptual framework that offers
three options for talking about a single thing unless some unique purpose is served by
each of the three.

5Paragraph 14, items a.1 and a.7.
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The three are now incoherent. All but one of the items in paragraph 14 are preventive,
and the exception needs to be revised to be unambiguously preventive. Yet paragraph 15
treats preventive safeguards as one of four categories. The other three categories in para
graph 15 are also preventive. No procedure or condition can qualify as a safeguard unless
it mitigates or eliminates threats (potential sources of bias). That means safeguards pre
vent the potential source of bias from having the undesirable effect on objective auditing.
In that sense, they are preventive. They may have other characteristics as well, but the
characteristics that make them safeguards are preventive. For this reason, item 14.a.7
should be revised. It is only the prospect of disciplinary actions that function as safe
guards. Disciplinary actions are safeguards only to the extent that they deter other audi
tors from biased auditing and violations of independence rules.
The first sentence of paragraph 16 is untrue. All safeguards do not “restrict activities or
relationships,” as demonstrated by the list in paragraph 14.
A partial remedy to the discord in this passage would be to delete paragraph 15, charac
terize all the examples in paragraph 14 as preventive, and state that paragraph 16 refers
only to a subset of what is in paragraph 14 (for example: “Safeguards that restrict activi
ties or relationships can be divided into four types”).
Paragraph 17 shows the interaction of safeguards with the useless threat categories ana
lyzed above. The paragraph should be deleted and its first two sentences relocated in
paragraph 14. Since the threat categories are by admission not mutually exclusive, their
correlations with safeguards are not mutually exclusive.

The Interested -P arties’-View s Principle (paragraphs 30-32)
Paragraph 30 sets out the ED ’s fourth principle of independence. It directs independence
decision makers to consider the views of parties with an interest in financial reporting and
to resolve independence issues “based on the decision m akers’ judgment about how best
to meet the goal of auditor independence.” We believe the principle’s final words should
be “based on the decision makers’ judgment about how best to arrive at an acceptable
level o f independence risk.”
It is inconsistent to direct independence decision makers to determine an acceptable level
of independence risk (the first two principles) and to consider costs and benefits (the third
principle) and then to tell the same decision makers to resolve issues by a wholly differ
ent method, namely, by resorting somehow to the goal of independence, which, though
vague, can be interpreted as based on stakeholders’ attitudes. The interpretation is en
couraged by the last sentence of paragraph 32 (“In order to achieve the goal of auditor
independence..., all independence decision m akers...should be sensitive to the likely
views of investors, other users, and other interested parties, and the impact their decisions
may have on those views”). The fourth principle should be consistent with the prior three.
It can be made consistent by the change we recommend.
Paragraph 59 of the Basis for Conclusions, explaining this principle, says independence
decision makers should ask “whether well-informed investors and other users would rea

11
sonably consider the activities, relationships, or other circumstances in question as pre
cluding independence.” As already pointed out, “and other users” incorporates the views
of not-well-informed stakeholders. More importantly, it does not serve the public interest
to try to go in this way beyond the wisdom and effectiveness of arguments gathered from
interested parties and the Board’s own reasoning and findings. Speculation about atti
tudes of fictional parties, even fictional “well-informed” parties, does not serve the public
interest. It opens the road to fuzzy thinking and arbitrary decisions. It tells those inter
ested parties who do submit reasoned views that they are unimportant, because the Board
is going to consider instead the hypothetical views of “well-informed investors and other
users.” Participation by interested parties in ISB standard setting would decline from its
already low level when it is realized that the Board’s approach as indicated by paragraph
59 supersedes evaluating the risk of compromised objectivity based on available argu
ment and evidence about threats and safeguards.
Paragraph 56 of the Basis for Conclusions says that the Board considered three ap
proaches to this principle and that it rejected “developing] standards that reflect the
likely views of reasonable, fully informed investors or some other group or groups of in
terested parties.” The sentence at issue from paragraph 59 brings to bear the approach
paragraph 56 says the Board rejected.
We recognize that a Board or other independence decision makers would be free to say
the goal of independence is best achieved by focusing exclusively on the risk model in
the first three principles. That would be a better outcome than attempting to resolve is
sues according to the appearances-approach that can be read into the idea of achieving the
goal or according to the hypothetical investor approach from paragraph 59. But it would
not be an ineluctable outcome, and it would not be a consistent outcome. It would depend
on politics and personalities. The process would demonstrate that the conceptual frame
work in this ED is attended by too many internal tensions and confusions to do the job it
is supposed to do, create a principles-based approach to independence decisions. The ten
sions and confusions would be greatly reduced by the change we recommend to this prin
ciple.

Principles of Auditor Independence—The Risk Continuum
The independence-risk continuum in paragraph 23 uses language that is internally incon
sistent. The five-point range of likelihoods ascends with these descriptors: virtually im
possible, very unlikely, possible, probable, and virtually certain. Here are the first- and
second-entry dictionary definitions of “possible” and “probable” :
possible - 1. Capable of happening, existing, or being true without contradicting proven facts,
laws or circumstances. 2. Capable of occurring or being done without offense to character,
nature, or custom.
probable - 1. Likely to happen or be true. 2. Likely but uncertain; plausible.6

6 Both definitions are taken from The American Heritage Dictionary o f the English Language, Third Edi
tion (Houghton Mifflin Company: Boston and New York, 1996).
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Clearly, all that is probable is possible. It is equally clear that the scale makes no sense at
all with the word “possible” at its center. The points on both sides of what is possible are
also possible; that is, “very unlikely” and “probable” are both possible. In fact, everything
on the scale is possible except, perhaps, “virtually impossible.”
In short, because of the descriptors, the continuum in its current form is nonsense and
should not be in the conceptual framework.
***
If you have any questions about our comments and recommendations, please contact
John M. Guinan at 212-909-5449 orjguinan@ kpmg.com.
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Appendix
Why the A ppearance-of-lndependence Approach (Perceptions-ofInvestors Approach) Is Conceptually Unsound and Inconsistent
w ith th e Real World of Independence Decision M aking
Excerpts from KPMG’s Response to Discussion M em orandum 001, M ay 26, 2000
[On the goal of independence]
A conceptual framework with such a goal— that is, one that separated achieving credibil
ity from its origin in achieving reliability— would embrace and implicitly endorse audi
tors who commit fraud, auditors who violate generally accepted auditing standards
(GAAS), incompetent auditors, and baseless confidence in financial statements and in
capital markets that can lead to instability and misallocated capital. These points are
given briefly but more specifically below:
■ The auditor who knowingly works for credibility apart from reliability commits fraud
and does so in the same way that a preparer of fraudulent financial statements com
mits fraud—by intentionally misleading users of financial statements.
■ The auditor who unknowingly works for credibility apart from reliability is incompe
tent or the same as an incompetent. Providing a clean opinion on materially misstated
financial statements delivers credibility without reliability.
■ The auditor who works for credibility apart from reliability violates generally ac
cepted auditing standards (GAAS), because GAAS demands sufficient evidence and
is designed to ensure correct opinions. The auditor’s work and deliverable are de
voted exclusively to reliability.
■ Confidence in financial statements is not always good for the capital markets or the
economy. It is not good for them when the confidence is unwarranted and can lead to
destabilized markets and ineffectively allocated capital.
These four points compel this conclusion: A conceptual framework for independence that
incorporates the idea that credibility of financial statements is a goal separate from their
reliability, a goal that can and should be pursued on its own by auditors, would bring
within the realm of accepted behavior actions contrary to the public interest. Indeed, it
would implicitly treat that behavior as professionally desirable and in the interests of au
dit independence and audit quality. No public-spirited party should want such thoughts in
the ISB’s conceptual framework.
Audit quality leads to reliable financial statements, which, other things being equal,
would add to their credibility. How otherwise should an auditor work for credibility? As
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suming the work for credibility apart from reliability excluded the nefarious options cited
above, what seems to remain is public relations and sales efforts of the sort that lead ac
countants to be criticized for behaving commercially instead of professionally. There is
certainly nothing professional in touting credibility apart from reliability. The effect
would therefore be self-defeating, reducing the credibility of auditors and audited finan
cial statements.

[On the appearances approach to independence]
Paragraph 74 concedes that stakeholders do not know the members of the audit team of
the company they own or are considering for investment. This makes goals based on the
individual auditor’s appearance inoperative and inappropriate. For this reason, paragraph
74 states: “[I]t can be argued that users’ and other stakeholders’ perceptions of, and their
confidence in, the improved financial statement reliability added by an independent audi
tor may depend on their beliefs about the independence of auditors generally and about
the effectiveness of the totality of the self-regulatory and public regulatory processes, in
cluding those concerning auditor independence, that help ensure audit quality.”
This seems to be a version of the idea of profession-independence from R. K. Mautz and
Hussein A. Sharaf, more recently cited and explicated in an article by Douglas R. Carmi
chael in The CPA Journal.7 As Carmichael words it, “Profession-independence is the ap
parent independence of auditors, as a professional group, to the public.” The idea reap
pears in paragraph 168 (Section VII of the DM), and Mautz and Sharaf are quoted in a
footnote.
The profession-independence argument does not support the inclusion of credibility (or
appearance) goals, definitions, concepts, or principles in a conceptual framework for
auditor independence. The auditor on the job who is following independence rules is un
witnessed. Such unwitnessed activity and compliance cannot affect professionindependence (or appearance of independence). Auditors’ collective performance is the
primary influence on profession-independence, because audit failures get in the press,
public figures talk about them, and steps are taken to prevent them, which also can attract
attention. A consistently high level of audit failures would depress public estimates of
audit quality and from that base, everything connected to it. Note, however, that it is audit
quality that is perceived, not audit independence. If audit quality is the primary determi
nant of profession-independence, independence goals, definitions, concepts, principles,
and standards would contribute to profession-independence best by contributing to audit
quality— in other words by focusing on the auditor’s job under GAAS, to boost the reli
ability of financial reporting. There would be no argument for a separate self-sufficient
goal of credibility apart from the goal of the reliability of financial statements.
Institutions and authorities, primarily standard setters and enforcement bodies, also can
contribute to profession-independence by the respect they generate. Thus, apart from au7 Douglas R. Carmichael, “In Search of Concepts of Auditor Independence,” The CPA Journal, May 1999,
pp. 39-43.

15
dit quality and its consequences, so-called profession-independence is based primarily on
stakeholders’ perceptions of regulators. Perceptions of regulators and the regulatory envi
ronment are not perceptions of auditors, whether individually or as a group. At most there
are derived impressions of auditors, audit quality, and audit independence.
This process should not be confused with stakeholders’ perceptions of specific rules and
rulemaking processes. Stakeholders, as a group, do not know about the rules that institu
tions and authorities make and have made. We know this, for instance, from the
Earnscliffe research, but it can also be inferred from the complexity and arcane nature of
independence rules and from the extremely low level of stakeholder participation in the
ISB’s standard-setting operation. Because we have good reason to believe that there is no
widespread following of independence standard setting by stakeholders, basing standards
on how the ISB might appear could not have any significant influence on professionindependence.
Moreover, even if most stakeholders did follow standard setting closely, basing standards
for audit independence on the image of the standard setters, not on what they do for audit
quality and the reliability of financial statements, would diminish professionindependence, not raise it. Consider the consequence of public perceptions that the stan
dard setters were basing rules not on audit quality, but on how they, the standard setters,
were perceived. Rational stakeholders would evaluate independence standard setters (or
standards, if they did evaluate them) for their effect on the fact of independence, that is,
for their effect on the auditor’s work for reliability of financial statements. If they learned
that standard setters were not setting standards to boost audit quality through the fact of
independence, confidence in standard setting would plummet, as well it should. The idea
that the standard setters had ceased to be independent judges of what was best for audit
quality or audit independence, and instead were devoted primarily to how they appear,
would be dispiriting to all stakeholders. Putting such ideas in a conceptual framework
would ensure the dive in confidence. In short, arguments that independence standards
should be based on the image of standard setters risks depressing stakeholders’ confi
dence in the standard-setting process and in profession-independence.
The ISB has been constitutionally devised to build confidence in its work. It has an open
standard-setting process that could generate additional profession-independence, other
things being equal. Thus, new steps have been taken fairly recently to build professionindependence. We should let them work.

Stakeholders’ perceptions (the separate credibility goal, the appearance of independence
approach to independence, the idea of profession-independence) should not be in a goal
or in a definition of independence or in any concepts mentioned in Section V. Appear
ances, apart from the fact of independence, cannot affect audit quality or audit objectivity
or change the risk of fraud or the risk of financial injury to the investing public. They do
not affect in any way the reliability of financial statements. As we have seen, because
stakeholders do not perceive the conditions that affect auditors’ objectivity on the job or
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the auditors’ compliance with the rules and do not know the independence rules, the as
sumptions governing them, or how they are changing, profession-independence is based
primarily on audit quality and stakeholders’ attitudes toward institutions and authorities.
Setting standards based on contributing to audit quality is consistent with contributing to
profession-independence, because it improves audit quality. The notion that standard set
ters are basing standards on how they, the standard setters, might appear could damage
stakeholder trust in the system and profession-independence. Apart from that, it would be
of limited effect, given the low level of stakeholder awareness of what standard setters
are doing. The best way for institutions and authorities to win stakeholders’ approval and
confidence, therefore, is to base rules on what reduces risks to auditors’ objectivity to an
acceptable level, to thereby promote reliable financial statements, and to do this through
confidence-inducing due process.

[On an interested-parties-views principle]
To adopt the principle that standards should directly reflect stakeholders’ perceptions
(proposed principle 9A) would be pretense and sham. Standard setting is incompatible
with an abstract, pure democratic model, where the standards are made by the views of
the constituents. Kenneth Arrow, the Nobel laureate, showed that ideal outcomes could
not be a direct aggregation of constituent preferences.8 It would be inefficient, even if it
were feasible, to collect stakeholders’ perceptions in order to create standards from them
in a manner that reflects them all, or reflects even investors’ perceptions alone. Percep
tions differ and change over time, and research instruments must avoid shaping opinion
when obtaining it. Participation in the standard-setting process to date suggests that re
sponses to discussion documents can never be a source of representative comment. There
would be no reason to have a highly qualified Board if its sole function was to serve as a
conduit for some measure of stakeholder opinion. The Board’s obligation to set standards
with due-process input and its own thinking and deliberative processes reflects a sensible
division of labor. There is no reason to assume that busy investors want to study inde
pendence issues and drafts in order to have their views reflected directly in the Board’s
standards. They want to be able to trust the Board, and the Board will violate that trust if
it publicly endorses giving away its responsibility to set standards to a requirement to find
some measure called stakeholders’ perceptions.
The Board would lose any right to constituents’ cooperation if it asked for their views
and then put them in the trash in favor of the views of a hypothetical set of investors
(proposed principle 9B). All constituents who read the conceptual framework would
know the Board was going to trash their views, that the Board was just going through the
motions of meaningful due process. Constituents in such circumstances need not read the
conceptual framework to learn about the Board’s insult to their intelligence and misuse of
their time. All they would have to do is read the basis for the Board’s conclusions in its
standard-setting documents. The Board would there confess that regardless of whatever
wisdom and analytical truths constituents offered, the Board made decisions based on the
8 Kenneth J. Arrow, “Social Choice and Justice,” Collected Papers o f Kenneth J. Arrow, vol. 1, (Cam
bridge, MA: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press).
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hypothetical fully informed investor. The Board has received relatively little input so far
The well would soon run dry.
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American Accounting Association’s Financial Accounting Standards Committee
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A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence
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Laureen A. Maines; Krishna Palepu; Katherine Schipper;
Catherine M. Schrand; Douglas J. Skinner; Linda Vincent

The Financial Accounting Standards Committee o f the American Accounting
Association (hereinafter the Committee) is charged with responding to requests for input
on issues related to financial reporting. The Committee is pleased to respond to the ISB’s
invitation to comment on the Exposure Draft ED 00-2: A Conceptual Framework fo r
Auditor Independence (hereinafter the Exposure Draft). The comments in this letter
reflect the views o f the individuals on the Committee and not those o f the American
Accounting Association.
Our response to the Exposure Draft is presented in three sections. The first section
presents the Committee’s views as to characteristics o f a conceptually sound framework
for auditor independence, noting which o f these characteristics are and are not contained
in the Exposure Draft. The second section summarizes empirical academic literature on
auditor independence that is relevant to the conceptual framework. The third section
contains responses to the specific questions posed in the Exposure Draft. These
responses are based on the views laid out in the first section and empirical academic
research discussed in the second section.

Conceptual basis for a framework for auditor independence
The Committee believes the following characteristics should underlie a conceptual
framework for auditor independence. These characteristics are classified according to (1)
characteristics o f persons associated with or affected by auditor independence, (2)
characteristics related to consequences o f auditor independence, and (3) characteristics
related to the evaluation o f auditor independence.
Characteristics o f persons associated with or affected by auditor independence
1. The framework should recognize that independence resides in persons. An
independence framework should distinguish the auditor from his/her firm and should
acknowledge that the individual auditor faces incentives and penalties that may differ
from those facing the audit firm as a whole.
2. The framework should recognize that the entity whose financial reports are the
subject o f the audit is not a natural person (i.e., the client) with a unique state o f mind.
Rather, the committee believes the framework should adopt a contracting view, in
which a corporation is composed o f multiple groups o f economic agents, each with

potentially different interests. The auditor has relations and interactions with several
o f the contracting parties who comprise the entity whose financial reports are being
audited. For example, an auditor might interact with members o f management and
the audit committee o f the board o f directors. Since the latter have an oversight
function with respect to the former, the interests o f the two (management and audit
committee) cannot be assumed to be identical.
3. The framework should recognize that the benefits o f auditor independence depend on
the perceptions o f individuals who rely on auditors’ decisions. These perceptions
include both those related to various factors that create and mitigate bias in auditors’
decisions and those related to the importance o f independence to the overall quality of
auditors’ decisions. The framework should consider primarily the views o f
“reasonable” financial statement users who have full information and process this
information appropriately.

Characteristics related to consequences o f auditor independence
4. The framework should recognize that the relevant consequence o f auditor
independence is its effect on auditors’ decisions.
5. The framework should acknowledge that auditor independence has both benefits and
costs. Such an approach would recognize that auditor independence is not an
objective in and o f itself, but is desirable if it improves the quality o f auditors’
decisions and the decisions o f individuals who rely upon auditors’ decisions. This
approach also would recognize that there are costs to achieving auditor independence,
which should be weighed against the benefits associated with independence.
6. The framework should recognize that the quality o f auditors’ decisions is influenced
by both their independence and competence (expertise). Specifically, in the
assessment o f the benefits and costs o f auditor independence, the framework should
consider potential positive or negative effects on expertise o f attempts to achieve
independence.

Characteristics related to the evaluation o f auditor independence
7. The framework should evaluate auditor independence in terms o f observable factors
that are likely to influence whether an auditor’s decisions are unbiased, rather than in
terms o f unobservable factors, such as an auditor’s state o f mind. Observable factors
include both factors that create bias in auditors’ decisions and factors that mitigate
this bias.
8. The framework should evaluate an auditor’s independence in terms o f a continuum
(i.e., the degree o f independence), rather than as a dichotomous variable (i.e., an
auditor is either independent or not independent).
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The Committee believes that the Exposure Draft largely integrates characteristics 1,
4, 5, and 8 into its framework for auditor independence. In the Committee’s opinion, the
Exposure D raft’s framework integrates characteristics 3 and 7 in a limited fashion and
does not integrate characteristics 2 and 6. We discuss issues related to the partial
inclusion o f characteristics 3 and 7 in our response to question 1 o f the Exposure Draft.
Additionally, we comment on the exclusion o f characteristics 2 and 6 in our response to
question 5 o f the Exposure Draft.

Review and discussion of empirical research
The academic research provides evidence relevant to both the Committee’s views on
characteristics o f a conceptually sound framework and the Exposure D raft’s proposed
auditor independence framework. The discussion o f this research is organized into four
sections: (1) factors that compromise auditor independence and lead to bias in auditors’
decisions, (2) factors that ameliorate impairments o f auditor independence and bias in
their decisions, (3) benefits and costs o f auditor independence, and (4) users’ perceptions
of auditor independence. Given the distinctive nature o f auditors’ knowledge, auditing
tasks, and the audit environment, we present conclusions about auditors’ judgments and
decisions only from research which examines auditors doing tasks that are taken from,
modeled on or adapted from their work environment, as opposed to conclusions from the
general judgment and decision-making literature.1

1. Factors that compromise auditor independence
Research indicates that auditors’judgments and decisions are influenced by
observable task and environmental factors. These factors include an auditor’s
involvement in prior audits o f a client and incentives to retain audit or acquire non-audit
engagements.
Tan (1995) shows that auditors’ judgments are influenced by their involvement in
prior audits o f a client. Specifically, in his study, auditors who were involved in the
prior-year audit paid more attention to current-year audit information that was consistent
with judgments made for the prior-year audit than did auditors who were not involved in
the prior-year audit. This suggests that auditors do not evaluate their own judgments in
the same manner as they evaluate the judgments o f other auditors.
Farmer et al. (1987) show that an auditor is more likely to agree with managers’
financial-reporting preferences when the risk o f losing an engagement is high versus low.
Trompeter (1994) finds that auditors who are compensated based on local-office
1For a discussion, see J. Smith and T. Kida, "Heuristics and Biases: Expertise and Task Realism in
Auditing," Psychological Bulletin 109:3, 1991, pp. 472-489. This paper contrasts research on biases in
auditors’ judgments with similar research in psychology on biases in the judgments of other individuals.
Smith and Kida conclude that auditors generally exhibit less bias or different types of bias than that found
in general psychology research.
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profitability are more likely to agree with clients’ preferences as GAAP becomes more
subjective. Overall, this research suggests that auditors’ judgments are influenced by
incentives to retain audit clients over time.
Other studies examine across-services incentives for obtaining or retaining non-audit
(e.g., consulting) engagements for audit clients. For example, Emby and Davidson
(1998) show that auditors’ judgments are influenced by client managers’ preferences for
financial reporting when auditors provide non-audit services for the client. The effect of
this factor is less when engagements involve specialized, as opposed to general, non-audit
services. This result suggests that auditors are less susceptible to manager pressures
when they possess greater economic power in their consulting arrangements with these
clients.

2. Incentives and institutions that ameliorate impairments o f auditor independence
Research documents several factors that mitigate the effects o f factors that
compromise auditor independence. These mitigating factors include environmental
forces, such as litigation and reputation loss. These factors also encompass institutional
arrangements within audit firm s, including auditor rotation, the review process, peer
review and compensation arrangements. Finally, some o f the contracting parties at the
entity whose financial reports are being audited, such as audit committees, also provide
counterbalancing forces.
Several environmental forces mitigate the effects o f incentives faced by auditors to
compromise or impair their independence, including the possibility o f reputation loss and
the threat o f litigation or other similar sanctions.2 Individual auditors who face
significant penalties if they are caught having performed a defective audit have strong
incentives to avoid defective audits.3 Research indicates that the risk o f litigation reduces
the influence o f manager preferences on auditors’ decisions and deters unethical behavior
on the part o f auditors (Farmer et al. 1987; Trompeter 1994; Shafer et al. 1999). Wilson
and Grimlund (1990) also document that audit firms whose reputations have been
impaired due to a SEC disciplinary action suffer losses in terms o f market share and
client retention. These results indicate that environmental forces provide incentives for
auditors to enhance their independence by developing and implementing organizational
structures and processes related to independence.
Research has examined whether institutional arrangements within audit firms and the
audit profession provide mitigating forces against threats to auditor independence. Tan
(1995) finds that both auditor rotation and the hierarchical auditing review process reduce
2 Other environmental forces include strong self-regulatory mechanisms such as the Public Oversight
Board, the Auditing Standards Board, and the Independence Standards Board.
3 The argument that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995 reduced the penalties
for bad audits depends on whether the pre-PSLRA environment was one of merit-based litigation or one of
random losses imposed by a legal system where merit did not determine outcomes. Random
“enforcement” of rules would not be expected to induce compliance since the penalties are decided on
bases other than breaking or adhering to the rules.
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auditors’ overemphasis on information that is consistent with their prior judgments.
Similarly, Shafer et al. (1999) show that peer review deters unethical behavior on the part
of auditors. Certain types o f auditor compensation arrangements also appear to mitigate
the effect o f incentives for client retention. Trompeter (1994) finds that auditors do not
use the flexibility in GAAP to justify clients’ preferences when firm-wide, as opposed to
local-office, profitability is emphasized in auditor compensation arrangements (largepool compensation). Carcello et al. (2000) indicate that the type o f compensation plan
(small- versus large-pool) interacts with client size in determining the likelihood that an
auditor issues a going concern opinion. These results suggest that audit firms’
compensation plans play a role in whether auditors compromise their professional
judgment in light o f pressure from corporate managers.
Certain corporate governance arrangements, such as the audit committee o f the board
of directors, also appear to mitigate forces that compromise auditor independence.
McMullen (1996) documents that the presence o f an audit committee is associated with
lower auditor turnover involving an accounting disagreement. This finding suggests that
the presence o f an audit committee enhances auditors’ ability to withstand pressure from
client management.
Another governance arrangement that supports auditor independence is direct or
indirect monitoring o f the amount o f non-auditing services provided by auditors. Parkash
and Venable (1993) find that the amount o f recurring non-audit services purchased by
audit clients varies with proxies for the level o f agency costs between client managers
and shareholders. Specifically, they find smaller purchases o f non-audit services from
auditors when share ownership is dispersed and management owns a relatively lower
percentage o f stock. Firth (1997) documents a positive relation between the purchase of
non-audit services from the auditor and ownership concentration (measured as director
shareholdings and the percentage shareholding o f the largest owner), implying that lower
ownership concentrations—a proxy for agency costs—are associated with larger purchases
o f non-audit services from auditors. These results suggest that either corporate managers
or audit committees (or both) are sensitive to issues related to auditor independence when
purchasing non-audit services from their auditors.

3. Benefits and Costs to Auditor Independence
Research has documented several benefits o f higher quality audits, including reduced
risk perceptions on the part o f capital market participants and reduced earnings
management on the part o f corporate managers. The research uses general proxies fo r
audit quality, which do not distinguish between the effects o f auditor independence and
auditor competence.
Recent survey evidence documents one potential cost to auditors’ independence.
Specifically, this evidence suggests that placing restrictions on auditors’provision o f
non-audit services to audit clients may reduce auditor competence. The survey documents
a decline in students majoring in accounting and attributes this decline in part to
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students’perceptions that auditing provides a less-rewarding and challenging career
than other careers such as consulting.
Several studies document benefits associated with higher audit quality, with audit
quality typically defined in terms o f CPA firm size or audit fees. Beatty (1989)
documents that the degree o f underpricing in initial public offerings is lower when
higher-priced (i.e., higher quality) auditors are associated with a company’s financial
statements. Relatedly, Menon and Williams (1991) find that investment-banking fees
charged for initial public offerings are lower for firms that employ national (Big Eight)
auditing firms. Results o f both o f these studies suggest that market participants attribute
less risk to firms audited by large CPA firms. Becker et al. (1998) find that clients o f Big
Six auditing firms exhibit smaller amounts o f income-increasing earnings management
than companies audited by non-Big Six auditing firms. Although these studies document
benefits o f audits provided by higher quality CPA firms, the proxies used for auditor
quality are imprecise and do not distinguish whether the higher quality o f large CPA
firms is due to greater independence or greater competence.
A recent study published by the American Accounting Association suggests that a
potential cost o f increasing auditor independence via restriction o f certain activities is a
reduction in the competence o f persons choosing the auditing profession.4 This study
shows that the accounting profession currently faces problems acquiring high quality
professional employees. Specifically, the study indicates that the number o f accounting
graduates (per year) has decreased approximately 25% from 1995-96 to 1998-99.
Additionally, 80% o f educators and 46% o f practitioners believe that accounting students
are currently less qualified than in the past. Educators and practitioners attribute this
decline primarily to two factors: (1) the relatively lower starting salaries in accounting
compared to other business disciplines such as information systems and finance and (2)
students’ perceptions that accounting is less challenging and rewarding than other fields
of study. Approximately 90% o f the practitioners and accounting educators surveyed in
the study strongly agree that consulting work in CPA firms is viewed as challenging and
rewarding; however, only about 60% o f these two groups strongly agree that audit
services in a CPA firm are challenging and rewarding. Thus, improving auditor
independence by imposing restrictions on auditors’ provision o f consulting services may
further reduce the quality o f students who choose employment at CPA firms.

4. Users’perceptions o f auditor independence
In general, financial statements users express greater concerns about auditor
independence than do auditors. Research suggests that these differences are related in
part to experience and knowledge differences between users and auditors. Research has
focused on effects o f one specific factor that may compromise independence, the
provision o f non-audit services to audit clients, on users’perceptions o f auditor
independence. Results o f this research generally suggest that financial statement users
4See W. S. Albrecht and R. J. Sack, Accounting Education: Charting the Course Through a Perilous
Future, Sarasota, FL: American Accounting Association, 2000.
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believe relatively small amounts o f consulting services have little effect on auditor
independence and increase auditor competence. Separation o f the audit sta ff from the
sta ff performing consulting services also increases the perceived independence o f
auditors.
Several studies show that financial statement users express greater concern than do
auditors that factors such as competition, the provision o f non-audit services, and
incentives to retain clients negatively affect auditor independence (Shockley 1981;
Reckers and Stagliano 1981; Firth 1980).5 This result may be due in part to users’ lower
levels o f knowledge about the auditing profession and the audit environment. For
example, Reckers and Stagliano (1981) find that a larger percentage o f MBA students
express concerns about auditor independence than do financial analysts. Analysis in
Shockley (1981) indicates that partners in Big Eight CPA firms have more complex
mental models for evaluating auditor independence than the mental models o f
commercial loan officers and financial analysts. Thus, some financial statement users’
concerns about auditor independence may reflect a lack o f understanding o f the checks
and balances in the audit environment, regardless o f whether the issue is over-time or
cross-sectional threats to independence.6
Results o f research on users’ perceptions o f the effect o f non-audit services on auditor
independence suggest that various factors mitigate users’ concerns about compromised
auditor independence. For example, several studies show that users perceive little
impairment in auditor independence when the amount o f non-auditing services provided
to clients is small (Lowe and Pany 1995; 1996). Studies indicate that users perceive that
small amounts o f non-audit service enhance, rather than reduce, audit quality (McKinley
et al. 1985; Pany and Reckers 1988). Additionally, the use o f separate staffs for
providing audit and non-audit services reduces users’ concerns about auditor
independence (Lowe and Pany 1995). Overall, these results are consistent with the idea
that users believe that there are positive synergies between auditing and consulting.
Users perceive the benefits o f these positive synergies to exceed negative effects on
independence as long as the consulting fees are not material to an individual office, and
audit and non-audit services are provided by different individuals within the firm.

5 Much of the research on financial statement users’ perceptions of the effect of non-audit services on
auditor independence was conducted during the 1980s, a time period in which the level of non-audit
services provided was less than that provided in the 1990s. The results of these older studies should be
evaluated in light o f this limitation.
6 These results for financial statement users are consistent with research on the psychology of attitude
formation. Psychology research finds that peoples’ beliefs about groups to which they do not belong (e.g.,
college students’ beliefs about senior citizens) are less complex than their beliefs about groups to which
they do belong (e.g., college students beliefs’ about other college students). These simpler belief structures
lead to more extreme beliefs for out-groups than in-groups (Eagly and Chaiken 1993, 120; Linville 1982).
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Responses to questions posed in the Exposure Draft
Q1

The proposed conceptual fram ew ork defines auditor independence as “freedom
from those pressures and other factors that compromise, or can reasonably be
expected to compromise, an auditors ’ ability to make unbiased audit decisions. ”
Is this definition appropriate? I f not, what changes would you suggest, and why?
We believe that the definition should be modified to state “freedom from the
effects o f those pressures and other factors that can com prom ise.. ."The
definition as stated implies the absence o f factors that significantly compromise
an auditor’s ability to make unbiased decisions. This approach is inconsistent with
subsequent portions o f the Exposure Draft’s conceptual framework, specifically
the independence risk model in which threats to auditor independence can be
mitigated by safeguards. The Committee’s modification to the definition o f
auditor independence incorporates the idea underlying the independence risk
model, i.e., that safeguards can mitigate the effects o f independence threats on
auditors’ ability to make unbiased decisions.
We agree with the definition’s focus on auditors’ decision making and on
observable factors that can influence auditors’ decisions, as indicated in points 4
and 7 in our discussion o f the conceptual basis for a framework for auditor
independence. However, as noted above, the Exposure D raft’s definition does not
reflect the idea that safeguards can mitigate threats. Since both threats and
safeguards are observable factors (at least to certain groups), the Committee
believes that the definition o f auditor independence should reflect the effects o f
both threats and safeguards, consistent with point 7 o f our discussion o f the
conceptual basis for a framework for auditor independence.
We also agree with the inclusion o f the clause “or can reasonably be expected to
compromise” in the definition o f auditor independence. This clause reflects the
Committee’s view (point 3 o f our discussion o f the conceptual basis for a
framework for auditor independence) that the benefits o f auditor independence
depend on the perceptions o f individuals who rely on auditors’ decisions. For the
benefits o f independence to accrue, it is not sufficient that auditors are unaffected
by factors that may compromise unbiased decisions; reasonable users who rely on
auditor judgments must also perceive that such factors do not compromise
auditors’ decisions. Additionally, the inclusion o f the word “reasonably” in the
definition is consistent with research indicating that financial statement users’
views about auditor independence depend on their knowledge about auditors and
the audit environment. Financial statement users can have unreasonable beliefs
about auditor independence for two reasons: either they are not fully informed or
they fail to process information rationally. The Committee suggests the
possibility that the group most likely to avoid both conditions is corporate audit
committees, because o f their expertise and access to information.
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While we agree with the inclusion o f the words “reasonably expected” in this
clause, we disagree with the Exposure Draft’s approach for assessing “reasonable
expectations.” As indicated in paragraph 56 o f the Exposure Draft, the ISB plans
to incorporate users’ views by soliciting comments from users, while formulating
standards based on the ISB’s evaluation o f these views and the ISB's judgment
about how to best meet the goal o f auditor independence. While this approach
may be appropriate for the ISB, it limits the applicability o f the conceptual
framework for other groups who are not in a position to solicit users’ views. The
Committee proposes that the Exposure Draft take the second approach stated in
paragraph 56, that o f incorporating the viewpoint o f fully informed financial
statement users, such as audit committee members. The approach stated in the
Exposure Draft (i.e., having the ISB solicit users’ views) can be viewed as the
method by which the ISB implements this second approach. Other independence
decision makers, such corporate audit committees, may choose other methods,
such as using their professional judgment as a surrogate for reasonable views of
financial statement users.

Q2

The proposed conceptual fram ew ork states that the goal o f auditor independence
is “to support user reliance on the financial reporting process and to enhance
capital market efficiency. ”
Is this goal appropriate? I f not, what changes would you suggest, and why?
In general, we believe that this goal is appropriate. This goal is consistent with
both the Committee’s view (stated in point 5 o f our discussion o f the conceptual
basis for a framework for auditor independence) and research indicating that
auditor quality (competence and independence) influences capital markets
participants' assessments of the risk o f investments. We believe, however, that
the goal should emphasize more strongly that auditor independence is important
for all users o f financial statements (including, for example, creditors, employees,
suppliers). While the focus on investors in the capital markets is consistent with
the mission o f the ISB as stated in paragraph 42 o f the Exposure Draft, an
emphasis on multiple users o f financial statements will broaden the applicability
o f the conceptual framework.

Q3

The proposed conceptual fram ew ork contains basic principles related to fo u r
concepts o f auditor independence: threats, safeguards, independence risk, and
significance o f threats/effectiveness o f safeguards. The concepts and basic
principles contained in the proposed fram ew ork are intended to serve as
guidelines fo r independence decision makers to analyze and resolve independence
issues.
Are the concepts and basic principles appropriate and sufficiently operational? I f
not, what changes would you suggest, and why?
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We agree with the concepts o f threats to auditor independence and safeguards
against those threats. These concepts are consistent with both the Committee’s
view (expressed in point 7 o f our discussion o f the conceptual basis for a
framework for auditor independence) and empirical accounting research.
Specifically, research documents that at least two o f the threats listed in the
Exposure Draft (self-interest threats and self-review threats) can influence
auditors’ judgments. Research also supports the efficacy o f various factors that
mitigate these threats, including factors in both categories listed in paragraph 14
o f the Exposure Draft. We also agree that independence threats and safeguards
combine to determine independence risk, as noted in the definition o f
independence risk. We comment on the Exposure D raft’s independence risk
model in Q4 below.
Q4

Paragraphs 49-53 describe the elements o f a risk model fo r auditor independence
in which independence risk is a function o f the significance o f threats to auditor
independence and the effectiveness o f safeguards to auditor independence.
What are your views on the appropriateness o f the independence risk model? Is
there research that the Board should be made aware o f that would be helpful in
expanding the model or otherwise making it more useful fo r independence
decision makers? I f so, please describe that research.
As noted in the response to Q3, we agree with the concepts underlying the
independence risk model, i.e., that independence threats and safeguards combine
to determine independence risk. We believe that the independence risk model
would be more useful for independence decision makers if it were stated with
greater specification, using an approach similar to that for audit risk. In the audit
risk model, audit risk is typically viewed as a multiplicative function o f inherent
risk, control risk, and detection risk (SAS No. 47). Similarly, the independence
risk model can be viewed as a multiplicative function o f two risks: the risk that
threats to independence exist and the risk that safeguards do not eliminate these
risks.
This approach would separate the assessment o f the probability that unmitigated
threats to independence exist from the assessment o f the implications o f such
unmitigated threats. In the Exposure Draft, the assessment o f the probability o f
an unmitigated threat (i.e., independence risk) is confounded with the assessment
o f the magnitude o f the impact o f the unmitigated threat. For example, paragraph
19 defines the significance o f a threat to auditor independence as “the extent to
which the threat increases independence risk.” While this definition appears to
relate to assessing the probability that the threat will affect independence,
examples in paragraph 19 o f factors that affect the significance o f a threat include
items that influence the magnitude o f the consequence o f the threat, not the
probability o f the threat. For example, “the importance o f the matter that is the
subject o f the activity” relates more to assessing the magnitude o f the effect o f a
threat than to assessing the probability that a threat exists.
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Accordingly, we recommend that the independence risk model separate the
assessment o f the probability that unmitigated threats to independence affect an
auditor’s ability to make unbiased decisions from the assessment o f the magnitude
o f effects o f these unmitigated threats. The first assessment would emulate the
audit risk model, defining independence risk as a multiplicative function o f the
risk that threats to independence exist and the risk that existing safeguards do not
eliminate these threats. The magnitude o f consequences associated with threats
that are not fully mitigated would then be assessed separately. The expected
impact o f independence risk would then be estimated by multiplying the
independence risk probability by the estimated magnitude o f consequences.
Such an approach allows for a cost/benefit evaluation o f safeguards that mitigate
independence threats. For example, if no safeguards currently exist, the cost o f a
threat to independence is the probability o f the threat multiplied by the magnitude
o f the consequences o f the threat. This cost can also be viewed as the benefit that
would accrue if a safeguard totally eliminates the threat. This benefit could be
compared against the cost o f implementing the safeguard.
We realize that it may be infeasible to specify values for parameters o f the model
in specific situations; i.e., it may be difficult to estimate the probability that a
particular safeguard will mitigate a threat to auditor independence or to assess the
magnitude o f consequences o f such a threat. However, we believe that the
structure o f this model will enhance individuals’ ability to evaluate auditor
independence by specifying the different constructs that relate to effects o f
deviations from auditor independence.
We agree with the focus in paragraph 30 o f the Exposure Draft related to
considering the views o f users o f financial reports and other individuals who rely
on auditor decisions. As indicated previously (point 3 o f our discussion o f the
conceptual basis for a framework for auditor independence and our response to
Q 1), the views o f reasonable financial statement users are important to assessing
the likelihood that threats to independence exist and the probability that
safeguards fail to eliminate this threat. Additionally, consequences to individuals
who rely on auditors’ judgments will be a significant part o f the assessment o f
consequences o f independence risk.

Q5

Are there other issues in connection with the proposed conceptual fram ew ork that
the Board should consider? I f so, what are those issues, and how would you
advise the Board to resolve them?
As indicated in the first section o f this comment letter, the Committee believes
the Exposure Draft’s conceptual framework does not incorporate two important
elements. First, we believe the Exposure Draft should explicitly include the view
that the entity whose financial reports are the subject o f the audit is not a
natural person with one state o f mind, but rather is composed o f multiple groups
o f contracting parties (point 2 o f our discussion o f the conceptual basis for a
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framework for auditor independence). Separating an audit client into its various
groups (e.g., management, audit committee) should aid in the identification o f
threats to auditor independence that are created by auditors’ interactions with
these various groups. Similarly, this approach should aid in evaluating the
effectiveness o f safeguards to threats to auditor independence. For example,
auditors’ interactions with management are likely to result in threats to auditor
independence, while auditors’ interactions with the company’s audit committee
are likely to mitigate some o f these threats.
Second, the Committee believes that the framework should incorporate more
explicitly the idea that audit quality is a function o f both auditor independence
and auditor competence, and that achieving high levels o f auditor independence
can have negative effects on audit firms’ ability to obtain high levels o f
competence in its human capital. While the Exposure Draft refers
to such “second-order” effects in paragraph 29, the Committee believes these
effects are not given sufficient prominence. In the Committee’s opinion, these
“second-order” effects are at least as important as the “first-order” costs o f
developing and implementing safeguards because the second-order effects can
result in the failure to achieve the overall goal o f auditor independence, i.e.,
higher quality audits. We believe that auditor independence cannot be evaluated
separately from auditor competence given the interactions between the two.
Accordingly, we recommend that the interactive effects o f auditor independence
and auditor competence be explicitly addressed in the conceptual framework.
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06 March 2001
Arthur Siegel, Executive Director
Independence Standards Board
6th Floor
1211 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10036-8775
RE: ED 00-2, A Conceptual Framework fo r Auditors Independence

Dear Mr. Siegel:
The Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR)1 is pleased to comment on the
Independence Standards Board’s Exposure Draft, A Conceptual Framework fo r Auditors Independence
(ED). The Audit Subcommittee of the AIMR U.S. Advocacy Committee (AIMR Committee)2 offers its
comments below.

General Comments
The AIMR Committee commends the Board on it efforts to establish a conceptual framework for
auditors’ independence. As mentioned in our previous comment letter3, such a framework is essential
in the development of principles-based set of standards for auditor independence and must provide for
the following:
1) direction and structure for the Board for promulgating sound and consistent standards of
independence, as well as resolving independence issues and questions;
2) guidance to those making decisions regarding auditor independence in absence of ISB
standards and other independence rules;
3) assurance to stakeholders that auditors’ independence is being maintained; and
4) boundaries for debate and discussions of issues related to auditor independence between
stakeholders and the Board in developing, or enhancing, auditor independence standards.

The Association for Investment Management and Research is a global, nonprofit organization of over 48,000 investment professionals
from over 90 countries. Through its headquarters in the U.S. and more than 100 Member Societies and Member Chapters throughout the
world AIMR provides global leadership in investment education, professional standards, and advocacy programs.
2 The U.S. Advocacy Committee is a standing committee of AIMR charged with responding to new regulatory, legislative, and other
developments in the United States affecting the efficiencies of U.S. financial markets.
3 Comment letter addressed to Arthur Siegel, Executive Director at ISB, regarding Discussion Memorandum 00-1, A Conceptual
Framework for Auditors Independence, dated June 1, 2000.
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W e believe that external auditors, who are independent and objective, play a critical role in
maintaining the credibility of the financial information disseminated and used by market participants in
making informed investment decisions. Consequently, independent auditors are integral to the overall
stability and strength of these markets. Moreover, credible and reliable information is essential for the
efficient operation of financial capital markets, insuring that capital will be allocated to those
investments that create the greatest returns commensurate with the risks and uncertainties of the
investments. The ability to discern these risks and uncertainties has become critical (as well as
difficult) for users of financial statements because more measurements and valuations are based on
management’s subjectivity and discretion. Thus, an objective opinion of an independent auditor is
paramount, especially in regards to the reliability of these valuations and adequacy of the related
disclosures.

Comments of Specific Issues
Definition of Auditor Independence
W e believe that the following proposed definition should be modified to be more explicit about the
perception of independence Auditor independence is freedom from those pressures and other factors that compromise, or
can reasonably be expected to compromise, an auditor's ability to make unbiased audit
decisions.
The wording of the definition should be more consistent with the concept of independence noted in the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s recent revision of auditor independent requirements. The
revised rule state that an auditor is not independent if a reasonable investor, with knowledge o f all
relevant facts and circumstances, would conclude that the auditor is not capable o f exercising
objective and impartial judgment. We believe that this consistency will make the ISB’s definition of
auditor independence congruent with the SEC’s concept of independence noted above.

Goal of Auditor Independence
W e agree strongly with the proposed goal of auditor independence, which emphasizes the user’s
reliance on the financial reporting process and to enhance capital market efficiency. However, we
recommend that “users” identified in paragraph 8 of the proposed framework be expanded to include
the independent members of an enterprise’s board of directors, in particular, members of the audit
committee. Those board members are responsible for both the governance of the enterprise and the
financial statements presented to the public. Thus, they also must rely on the auditor’s opinions, as
well as the representations made by management, in making decisions about corporate governance,

including whether to engage or terminate relationships with the audit firm.
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Auditor Independence Concepts
W e believe that the following concepts are necessary components of an effective framework for
auditor independence: (1) threats to auditor independence; (2) safeguards to auditor independence; (3)
independence risk; and (4) significance of threats and effectiveness of safeguards.

■ Threats to Auditor Independence - We recommend that the “perception” of whether
independence is impaired be incorporated into the definition of threats to auditor
independence. Additionally, we believe that the illustrative examples of threats to auditor
independence provide good guidance for assessing whether auditor independence is
impaired by the following threats: (1) self-interest; (2) self-review; (3) advocacy; (4)
familiarity (or trust); and (5) intimidation. Therefore, this guidance should remain a part of
the conceptual framework.

■ Safeguards to Auditor Independence - We agree with the proposed definition of
safeguards. In addition to the seven safeguards noted under paragraph 14(a), we
recommend that disclosure of current (as well as pending) relationships between the audit
firm and its audit client should be included as a safeguard. Such a disclosure was
considered necessary information by 84% of 970 respondents (who are analysts and
portfolio managers) surveyed by AIMR in August 2000.

■ Independence Risk - We agree with the proposed definition of independence risk. The
independence risk is expressed as a point on a continuum that ranges from no independence
risk to maximum independence risk. However, we suggest that the conceptual framework
include some guidance as to what level of risk is appropriate once all threats to
independence and safeguards utilized to mitigate these threats have been analyzed and
assessed. In other words, define the acceptable level of risk or provide some guidance in
determining the acceptable level of risk.

■ Significance of Threats and Effectiveness of Safeguards - We agree with the proposed
definitions for the significance of threats and effectiveness of safeguards. A thorough
assessment of independence risk must include an analysis of the types of threats and
safeguards affecting independence. This analysis should consider the degree of severity or
significance of the actual or potential threats to auditor independence offset by those
safeguards that effectively mitigate or eliminate the effect of the identified threats.

Principles of Auditor Independence
We believe that underlying principles are essential in developing an effective code of standards for
professional conduct. Three of the four principles identified in the ED are appropriate - (1) assessing
the level of independence risk, (2) determining the acceptability of the level of independence risk, and
(3) considering the views of investors and other interested parties when auditor independence issues
are addressed. We believe that the latter principle is essential to assess properly the integrity (as well as
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perceived integrity) of the financial statements and other information disseminated to the public, who
use this information to make investment decisions.
However, we have concerns about the principle relating to the benefits and costs associated with
imposing safeguards to reduce independence risk. In particular, the example discussed in paragraph 29
to explain costs that would likely exceed benefits, or compromise the quality of the audit. The example
provided indicates that audit quality would be impaired if certain safeguards such as restrictions or
prohibitions were imposed, relating to investment in audit clients or employment relationships between
family members of the auditor and its audit client. Audit quality under these circumstances would be
diminished because the audit firm would have more difficulty in attracting employees.
We believe that the above example is flawed because it is not specific about the investments or
employment relationships. Certain investments and employment relationships should be prohibited or
restricted due to their nature and the level of risk they pose to auditor independence, regardless of the
cost. In a recent AIMR survey on auditor independence, 875 respondents (analysts and portfolio
managers) answered the following question: Should an audit firm, its partners or audit professional
staff be perm itted to have financial ownership or financial interest in the firm 's audit client?
o 85% of the respondents answered that audit firms should have no ownership or financial
interest in the audit client.
o 86% of the respondents answered that partners of the audit firm, who are involved in the
audit engagement, should have no ownership or financial interest in the audit client.
o 76% of the respondents answered that professional staff of the audit firm, who are involved
in the audit engagement, should have no ownership or financial interest in the audit client.
Concluding Remarks
The AIMR Committee commends the Board on its efforts to promulgate effective auditor
independence standards. We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments on this Exposure Draft
regarding a conceptual framework for auditor independence. Should you have any questions or need
elaboration with regards to the Committee’s comments, please do not hesitate to contact Georgene
Palacky at 804.951.5334 or gbp@aimr.org.

Sincerely,

DeWitt Bowman, CFA
Chair, Audit Subcommittee
AIMR Advocacy Advisory Committee

Georgene B. Palacky, CPA
Associate, Advocacy
AIMR Advocacy Program
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225 North Michigan Avenue
Chicago IL 60601-7600
Tel 312 782 0225

Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775

Fax 312 507 2548

Re: ED 00-2
Gentlemen:
We appreciate the opportunity to respond to your request for comments on Exposure Draft 00-2
(ED 00-2), A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence. The following are our responses to
key questions raised in the ED.
Definition of Auditor Independence
Auditor independence is defined as "freedom from those pressures and other factors that
compromise, or could be reasonably expected to compromise, the auditor's ability to make
unbiased audit decisions." This definition implies an absolute standard of "freedom" that could
never be met. Recognizing this, the ED in the sentence immediately following the definition
contradicts the definition by noting that there is no intention to imply the auditor must be free
of all pressures. The discussion continues by noting that it is only those factors that are "so
significant" that they could reasonably be expected to impair the auditor's objectivity.
We would suggest the definition be modified to acknowledge, as the ED does in the discussion,
that auditor independence does not require freedom from all influences. The definition should
stress that independence is an absence of influences that create an unacceptable risk of bias.
Goal of Auditor Independence
We agree that the goal of auditor independence is to support user reliance on the financial
reporting process. Although it is not unreasonable to claim that this goal would in turn
contribute to market efficiency, the profession's duties relate more immediately to reliable
financial reporting.
Concepts and Basic Principles of Auditor Independence
These sections of the ED provide a useful discussion of the concept of and basic principles
relating to independence. Paragraph 19 discusses the significance of threats to auditor
independence, noting that a specific threat depends on many factors. Although there is a
reference to "the importance" of the matter, we believe the notion of "materiality" of the matter

should be included. In some cases, the relationship or matter may give rise to one of the threats
identified in paragraph 12, yet because the relationship or matter is immaterial, an unacceptable
risk to independence does not exist. The concept of materiality should be recognized as a
threshold issue when considering the threats to independence.
Other Issues
In paragraph 1.d., the word 'boundary' implies that future discussions of independence will be
limited by the Framework's content. We do not believe this is the intent, or will be the effect, of
the final Framework.
In conclusion, we support the Board in its efforts, and believe that the structure and content of
the Framework will be very useful. If you should you have any questions on our comments,
please feel free to call Charles A. Horstmann at (312) 507-3071 or Jean L. Rothbarth at (312) 5072827.
Sincerely,
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February 28, 2001
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
N ew York, NY 10036-8775
Attn: ED 00-2
Gentlemen:
The AICPA’s Professional Ethics Executive Committee (PEEC) is pleased to submit
this comment letter to the Independence Standards Board with regard to ED 00-2,
Statement o f Independence Concepts - A Conceptual Framework fo r Auditor
Independence.
With regard to the specific questions outlined in the Exposure Draft, we have the
following comments:
1. The proposed conceptual framework defines auditor independence as “freedom
from those pressures and other factors that compromise, or can reasonably be
expected to compromise, an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions.”
As noted in our response to DM 00-1, we believe that the definition o f auditor
independence should be risk-based and include a materiality or unacceptable risk
threshold. We also believe that the phrase “freedom from pressures and other
factors" included in the definition is too absolute and could seldom be achieved.
We recommend that the Board consider using the phrase “absence o f influences"
which we believe better reflects the concept o f independence.
Accordingly, we recommend an independence definition as follows:
Auditor independence is an absence o f influences that create an
unacceptable risk o f bias with respect to an auditor’s ability to make
audit decisions.
2. The proposed conceptual framework states that the goal of auditor independence
is “to support user reliance on the financial reporting process and to enhance
capital market efficiency.”
We believe that the enhanced reliability o f audited financial information is the
primary value of the audit and that such reliability enhances the efficiency o f the
capital markets. The enhancement o f capital market efficiency is an indirect result
o f enhancing the reliability o f audited financial information.
We recommend that the Board revise the goal to refer to capital market
effectiveness instead of efficiency since effectiveness is a broader term and
captures the concept of efficiency.
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
Harborside Financial Center, 201 Plaza Three, Jersey City, NJ 07311-3881 • (201) 938-3000 • (212) 318-0500 • fax (201) 938-3329 • www.a
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3. The proposed conceptual framework contains basic principles related to four
concepts o f auditor independence: threats, safeguards, independence risk, and
significance of threats/effectiveness of safeguards. We believe that these concepts
are appropriate and generally agree with the basic principles except as specifically
stated below.
The second basic principle (par. 24) states that “Independence decision makers
should determine whether the level o f independence risk is at an acceptable
position on the independence risk continuum.'' Paragraph 26 further states that:
Some threats to auditor independence may affect only certain individuals
or groups within an auditing firm, and the significance o f some threats
may be different fo r different individuals or groups. To ensure that
independence risk is at an acceptably low level, independence decision
makers should identify the individuals or groups affected by threats to
auditor independence and the significance o f those threats. Different
types o f safeguards may be appropriate fo r different individuals and
groups depending on their roles in the audit.
We agree that independence decision makers should consider which individuals
within the firm are specifically affected by one or more threats to independence
and the types of safeguards that may be appropriate to mitigate or eliminate such
threats. However, we strongly recommend that the Board include a separate basic
principle that specifically incorporates an engagement-focused approach to
independence. The Board has already introduced this concept in ISB Standard No.
2 and embraced it in its project on Financial Interests and Family Relationships.
The SEC has also embraced this approach in its recent rulemaking and the PEEC
is in the process o f modernizing the AICPA’s independence rules along those
same lines. We agree that the threats to independence are strongest for those
individuals who serve on the audit engagement team and to some extent, to those
individuals who are otherwise in a position to influence the audit. Many other
individuals pose little or no threat to independence and can be subject to recusal
or consultation within the firm and accordingly, need not be subject to
independence restrictions. Independence decision makers would benefit if the
framework supported this approach through the inclusion o f a separate basic
principle.
Another component that we strongly believe should be included in a conceptual
framework is the concept o f materiality. The framework should explicitly
recognize the importance o f materiality as a threshold consideration in
determining whether an auditor could resist a potential threat to his or her
independence. The present implicit approach to addressing this through a
combination of threats and safeguards is too subtle and we believe would be
ineffective in conveying this important concept. Accordingly, we recommend
that the Board include a basic principle such as the following:
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Immaterial activities or relationships between individuals in an audit firm
(as well as the firm itse lf and an audit client should be presum ed not to
impair independence, absent evidence to the contrary.
4. We support the elements o f the risk model for auditor independence as described
in paragraphs 49-53 o f the proposed conceptual framework and believe that the
proposed risk model is appropriate. We are not aware o f other relevant research
to bring to your attention.
5.

We are not aware o f any other issues in connection with the proposed conceptual
framework that the Board should consider.

We appreciate this opportunity to comment. We would be pleased to discuss in
further detail these comments and any other matters with respect to the Board’s
Exposure Draft.
Sincerely,

James L. Curry
Chair
PEEC
cc:

Susan Coffey, Vice President
Self Regulation and SECPS
Lisa Snyder, Director
Professional Ethics Division
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February 28, 2001
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue o f the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
Attn: ED 00-2
Gentlemen:
The AICPA’s Professional Ethics Executive Committee (PEEC) is pleased to submit
this comment letter to the Independence Standards Board with regard to ED 00-2,
Statement o f Independence Concepts - A Conceptual Framework fo r Auditor
Independence.
With regard to the specific questions outlined in the Exposure Draft, we have the
following comments:
1.

The proposed conceptual framework defines auditor independence as “freedom
from those pressures and other factors that compromise, or can reasonably be
expected to compromise, an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions.”
As noted in our response to DM 00-1, we believe that the definition o f auditor
independence should be risk-based and include a materiality or unacceptable risk
threshold. We also believe that the phrase '‘freedom from pressures and other
factors” included in the definition is too absolute and could seldom be achieved.
We recommend that the Board consider using the phrase “absence o f influences”
which we believe better reflects the concept o f independence.
Accordingly, we recommend an independence definition as follows:
Auditor independence is an absence o f influences that create an
unacceptable risk o f bias with respect to an auditor’s ability to make
audit decisions.

2. The proposed conceptual framework states that the goal o f auditor independence
is “to support user reliance on the financial reporting process and to enhance
capital market efficiency.”
We believe that the enhanced reliability o f audited financial information is the
primary value o f the audit and that such reliability enhances the efficiency o f the
capital markets. The enhancement o f capital market efficiency is an indirect result
o f enhancing the reliability o f audited financial information.
We recommend that the Board revise the goal to refer to capital market
effectiveness instead o f efficiency since effectiveness is a broader term and
captures the concept o f efficiency.

3. The proposed conceptual framework contains basic principles related to four
concepts o f auditor independence: threats, safeguards, independence risk, and
significance o f threats/effectiveness o f safeguards. We believe that these concepts
are appropriate and generally agree with the basic principles except as specifically
stated below.
The second basic principle (par. 24) states that “Independence decision makers
should determine whether the level o f independence risk is at an acceptable
position on the independence risk continuum.” Paragraph 26 further states that:
Some threats to auditor independence may affect only certain individuals
or groups within an auditing firm, and the significance o f some threats
may be different fo r different individuals or groups. To ensure that
independence risk is at an acceptably low level, independence decision
makers should identify the individuals or groups affected by threats to
auditor independence and the significance o f those threats. Different
types o f safeguards may be appropriate fo r different individuals and
groups depending on their roles in the audit.
We agree that independence decision makers should consider which individuals
within the firm are specifically affected by one or more threats to independence
and the types o f safeguards that may be appropriate to mitigate or eliminate such
threats. However, we strongly recommend that the Board include a separate basic
principle that specifically incorporates an engagement-focused approach to
independence. The Board has already introduced this concept in ISB Standard No.
2 and embraced it in its project on Financial Interests and Family Relationships.
The SEC has also embraced this approach in its recent rulemaking and the PEEC
is in the process o f modernizing the AICPA’s independence rules along those
same lines. We agree that the threats to independence are strongest for those
individuals who serve on the audit engagement team and to some extent, to those
individuals who are otherwise in a position to influence the audit. Many other
individuals pose little or no threat to independence and can be subject to recusal
or consultation within the firm and accordingly, need not be subject to
independence restrictions. Independence decision makers would benefit if the
framework supported this approach through the inclusion o f a separate basic
principle.
Another component that we strongly believe should be included in a conceptual
framework is the concept o f materiality. The framework should explicitly
recognize the importance o f materiality as a threshold consideration in
determining whether an auditor could resist a potential threat to his or her
independence. The present implicit approach to addressing this through a
combination o f threats and safeguards is too subtle and we believe would be
ineffective in conveying this important concept. Accordingly, we recommend
that the Board include a basic principle such as the following:

2

Immaterial activities or relationships between individuals in an audit firm
(as well as the firm itself) and an audit client should be presum ed not to
impair independence, absent evidence to the contrary.
4. We support the elements o f the risk model for auditor independence as described
in paragraphs 49-53 o f the proposed conceptual framework and believe that the
proposed risk model is appropriate. We are not aware o f other relevant research
to bring to your attention.
5.

We are not aware o f any other issues in connection with the proposed conceptual
framework that the Board should consider.

We appreciate this opportunity to comment. We would be pleased to discuss in
further detail these comments and any other matters with respect to the Board’s
Exposure Draft.
Sincerely,

James L. Curry
Chair
PEEC
cc:

Susan Coffey, Vice President
Self Regulation and SECPS
Lisa Snyder, Director
Professional Ethics Division
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March 16, 2001
Mr. Arthur Siegel
Executive Director
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, New York 10036-8775
RE: Exposure Draft, Statement o f Independence Concepts: A Conceptual Framework for Auditor
Independence
Attn: ED 00-2

Dear Mr. Siegel:
The New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants, the oldest state accounting
association, represents 29,500 CPAs whose audit firms will be affected by the eventual outcomes
of the independence standards setting process addressed in the conceptual framework. We are
pleased to submit the attached comments regarding Independence Standards Board conceptual
framework exposure draft. With this letter I am transmitting the comments of the Auditing
Standards and Procedures Committee; the comments of the Professional Ethics Committee will
be sent to you separately. We appreciate the opportunity to express our beliefs concerning this
important exposure draft.
Please contact William Stocker, chair of the Auditing Standards and Procedures
Committee at (212) 503 - 8875, or Robert H. Colson, NYSSCPA Staff, at (212) 719-8350 if you
require further information.

Very truly yours,

P. Gerard Sokolski, CPA
President

NEW YORK STATE SOCIETY OF
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

Comments on
Independence Standards Board
Exposure Draft
Statement o f Independence Concepts: A Conceptual Framework
for Auditor Independence
ED 00-2

March 16, 2001

Principal Drafter
William Stocker, CPA, Chair
Auditing Standards and Procedures Committee

NYSSCPA
2000-2001 Accounting and Auditing General Committee

Brian A. Caswell (Chair)
Thomas O. Linder
William M. Stocker, III
Paul J. Wendell

Susan M. Barossi
Robert M. Sattler
Paul D. Warner

John F. Georger, Jr.
Robert E. Sohr
Robert N. Waxman

NYSSCPA
2000 - 2001 Auditing Standards and Procedures Committee

William M. Stocker, Chair
Romolo Roberto Calvi
Vincent Gabriel
Fred R. Goldstein
Neal B. Hitzig
Julian E. Jacoby
Jerry Marting Klein

Helen R. Liang
Joseph E. Manfre
Lawrence E. Nalitt
Wayne A. Nast
Bruce H. Nearon
R. Michael Peress
John J. Piccinnini

NYSSCPA Staff
Robert H. Colson

Thomas Sorrentino
Jonathan Brett Taylor
William H. Walters
Paul D. Warner
Barry Wexler
Margaret A. Wood

NEW YORK STATE SOCIETY OF
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
Comments on
Independence Standards Board
Exposure Draft
Statement of Independence Concepts: A Conceptual Framework
for Auditor Independence
ED 00-2
Comments of the Auditing Standards and Procedures Committee
The Auditing Standards and Procedures Committee agreed to express it concerns about
three issues related to the effects on auditors of adopting the Exposure Draft as a conceptual
framework. The Committee understands that not all aspects of these issues are completely
controlled by ISB, but believe that ISB should address them in their final statement.
Extension of Conceptual Framework to Broader Independence Issues
It became apparent to the committee during the course of its discussion that its members
had implicitly assumed that the application of the conceptual framework would go beyond the
auditors of SEC registrants, in spite of ISB’s officially restricted scope. At the conceptual
framework level, it will be difficult to sustain distinctions between concepts that apply differently
to SEC registrants and non-registrants. Moreover, conceptual distinctions of this nature would be
difficult to explain to the public.
Appropriate Treatment of Independence Safeguards
The committee discussed briefly the three elements of the conceptual framework related
to definitions, goals, and threats. However, its discussion on safeguards revealed several
concerns:
•

•
•

The committee agreed that, regardless of ISB’s possible desires to restrict the use of
the conceptual framework to its own deliberations, it would be inevitable that audit
firms would also use it for guidance and for formulating their independence
compliance programs. In this context, many members expressed a concern that
placing “safeguards” at the same level as “threats” in the conceptual framework
would lead firms to pay less attention to threats to independence because of the
(possibly over confident or mistaken) reliance on the existence of an adequate
safeguard for every threat.
Several members suggested that safeguards would be more appropriately handled as
an element of the cost/benefit analysis later in the conceptual framework.
Others indicated their belief that safeguards should not be specifically addressed in
the conceptual framework.

Appearance of Independence
The committee concluded that the conceptual framework was helpful in their discussions
related to independence in fact. However, they concluded that the conceptual framework does
not adequately provide guidance with respect to the appearance of independence. They believe
that appearance of independence should be more explicitly defined and discussed in the
conceptual framework, especially in light of the SEC’s recent rulemaking, which focuses almost
exclusively on appearance of independence.

n e w

y o r k

s t a t e

s o c i e t y

o f

N Y S S C P A
c e r

t i f i e d

p u b l i c

5 3 0
f i f t h
a v e n u e ,
w w w .n y s s c p a .o r g

a c c o u
n e w

n

t a n

y o r k ,

t s
n y

1 0 0 3 6 - 5 1 0 1

March 16, 2001 26
Mr. Arthur Siegel
Executive Director
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, New York 10036-8775

RE: Exposure Draft, Statement o f Independence Concepts: A Conceptual Framework fo r Auditor
Independence
Attn: ED 00-2

Dear Mr. Siegel:
The New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants, the oldest state accounting
association, represents 29,500 CPAs whose audit firms will be affected by the eventual outcomes
of the independence standards setting process addressed in the conceptual framework. We are
pleased to submit the attached comments regarding Independence Standards Board conceptual
framework exposure draft. With this letter I am transmitting the comments of the Professional
Ethics Committee; the comments of the Auditing Standards and Procedures Committee will be
sent to you separately. We appreciate the opportunity to express our beliefs concerning this
important exposure draft.
Please contact Allen Fetterman, chair of the Professional Ethics Committee at (212) 867 4000, or Robert H. Colson, NYSSCPA Staff, at (212) 719-8350 if you require further
information.

Very truly yours,

P. Gerard Sokolski, CPA
President

NEW YORK STATE SOCIETY OF
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS

Comments on
Independence Standards Board
Exposure Draft
Statement o f Independence Concepts: A Conceptual Framework
for Auditor Independence
ED 00-2

March 16, 2001

Principal Drafter
Allen Fetterman, CPA,
Professional Ethics Committee

NEW YORK STATE SOCIETY OF
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANTS
Comments on
Independence Standards Board
Exposure Draft
Statement o f Independence Concepts: A Conceptual Framework
for Auditor Independence
ED 00-2
Comments of the Professional Ethics Committee
The Professional Ethics Committee of the New York State Society of Certified Public
Accountants has reviewed the Exposure Draft (ED 00-2) of Statement of Independence Concepts:
A Conceptual Framework for Auditor Independence. The Committee thinks that the concepts
enumerated in the Exposure Draft represent a good step in the evolution of independence
standards applicable to the audits of public companies.
In response to the Questions for Respondents, the Committee has the following thoughts:
1. The definition of auditor independence is appropriate.
2. The goal of auditor independence should be to “support user reliance on the financial
reporting process.” Enhancing capital market efficiency is a benefit of that goal
(among other benefits) and not part of that goal.
3. The concepts and basic principles are appropriate and sufficiently operational.
4. The independence risk model is appropriate and comprehensive.
Specifically, in paragraph 28, the last two words, “reputational capital”, are too esoteric
and subject to misinterpretation. We suggest substituting “reputation”.
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March 27, 2001

Mr. Arthur Siegel
Executive Director
Independence Standards Board
1211 Avenue of the Americas, 6th Floor
New York, NY 10036-8775
Dear Mr. Siegel:
We have reviewed the Independence Standards Board's (ISB) Exposure Draft (ED)
00-2, Statem ent o f independence Concepts - A Conceptual Fram ew ork fo r Auditor
Independence. We support the framework as proposed and do not have any
substantive comments on it at this time.
As you know, Jim Schiro and Ken Dakdduk participated in the project task force that
assisted in the development of the ED. We look forward to their continued
participation in the effort to finalize a new conceptual framework for auditor
independence.
If you have any questions, please contact Kenton J. Sicchitano (212-707-6230) or
Kenneth E. Dakdduk (201-521-3048).
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